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use of force  
**REPORT**  
**2024**

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**NYPD**  
New York City Police Department

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 01.** Department Message
- 03.** In Memoriam
- 05.** Executive Summary
- 09.** NYPD Use of Force Policy
- 14.** Firearms Discharges
  - 14.** Overview
  - 18.** Intentional Discharges - Adversarial Conflict
  - 29.** Intentional Discharges - Animal Attack
  - 31.** Unintentional Discharges
  - 33.** Unauthorized Discharges
- 36.** Conducted Electrical Weapons
- 42.** General Uses of Force
- 51.** Force Appendices
  - 52.** Appendix A: NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process
  - 55.** Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict
    - Incidents
  - 59.** Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by Force Investigation Division
  - 69.** Appendix D: 2024 Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location of Occurrence
  - 71.** Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges
  - 75.** Appendix F: 2024 Use of Force Incidents by Members' Command

## TABLE OF FIGURES

FIGURE 01: 2024 Levels of Force	10
FIGURE 02: Historical Snapshot, 2016-2024	15
FIGURE 03: Intentional Discharges-Adversarial Conflict, 2016-2024	16
FIGURE 04: Intentional Discharges-Animal Attack, 2016-2024	16
FIGURE 05: Unintentional Discharges, 2016-2024	16
FIGURE 06: Unauthorized Discharges, 2016-2024	17
FIGURE 07: Total Discharges, 2016-2024	17
FIGURE 08: NYPD Firearms Discharge Incidents by Decade, 1971-2024	18
FIGURE 09: 2024 Adversarial Conflicts in Context	20
FIGURE 10: ID-AC Incidents, Subject Injuries and Deaths, 2016-2024	21
FIGURE 11: Threat Type in ID-AC Incidents, 2024	22
FIGURE 12: Gunfire in New York City, 2024	22
FIGURE 13: Race/Ethnicity of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects vs. Known Criminal Shooting Victims vs. Known ID-AC Subjects, 2024	23
FIGURE 14: Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID-AC, 2024	23
FIGURE 15: Rank of Members in ID-AC vs. Department Staffing, 2024	23
FIGURE 16: Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2012-2024	24
FIGURE 17: Member Assignment, ID-AC Incidents, 2024	25
FIGURE 18: ID-AC Incidents by Platoon, 2024	25
FIGURE 19: ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Geographic Borough, 2024	26
FIGURE 20: Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges - Adversarial Conflicts, 2024	27
FIGURE 21: Rounds Discharged per ID-AC Incident, 2024	28
FIGURE 22: Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AC Incidents, 2024	28
FIGURE 23: Objective Completion Rate, 2016-2024	28
FIGURE 24: ID-AC Distance to Target by Discharging Member, 2024	29
FIGURE 25: Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AA Incidents, 2024	30
FIGURE 26: Rounds Discharged per ID-AA Incident, 2024	30
FIGURE 27: ID-AA Incidents by Platoon, 2016-2024	30
FIGURE 28: ID-AA Incidents by Borough, 2024	30
FIGURE 29: Rank, Unintentional Discharges vs. Department Staffing, 2024	31
FIGURE 30: Years of Service, Unintentional Discharges vs. Department Staffing, 2024	32
FIGURE 31: UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2016-2024	42

## TABLE OF FIGURES (continued)

FIGURE 32: 2024 CEW Discharge Incidents, Event Type	37
FIGURE 33: CEW Deployment Mode, 2024	38
FIGURE 34: Effectiveness of CEW Discharges, 2024	39
FIGURE 35: CEW Discharges by Rank, 2024	40
FIGURE 36: CEW Discharge Incidents by Platoon, 2024	40
FIGURE 37: CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2024	41
FIGURE 38: 911 Calls for Service by Borough, 2024	41
FIGURE 39: Threat, Resistance, or Injury Reports, 2024	42
FIGURE 40: Force Reporting Levels, 2024	43
FIGURE 41: Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2024	43
FIGURE 42: Force Used During Arrests by Subject Race, 2024	44
FIGURE 43: Total Arrests by Subject Race, 2024	44
FIGURE 44: Uniformed Members Using Force, 2024	45
FIGURE 45: Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2024	45
FIGURE 46: Subjects of Force by Age/Race, 2024	46
FIGURE 47: Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2024	46
FIGURE 48: Force Reporting by Platoon, 2024	46
FIGURE 49: Force Reporting by Subject Race, 2024	47
FIGURE 50: Subjects of Force by Age, 2024	47
FIGURE 51: CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2016-2024	47
FIGURE 52: Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2024	48
FIGURE 53: Type of Force Used Against Members, 2024	49
FIGURE 54: Force Used Against Members by Platoon, 2024	50
FIGURE 55: Force Used Against Members by Geographic Borough, 2024	50
FIGURE 56: Use of Force Related Injuries, Subjects vs. Members, 2024	50
FIGURE 57: NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process	53
FIGURE 58: 2024 Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location of Occurrence	70
FIGURE 59: Members of the Service Shot and Killed by Subjects by Decade, 1971-2024	72
FIGURE 60: Members of the Service Shot and Injured by Subjects by Decade, 1971-2024	72
FIGURE 61: Subjects Shot and Killed by Members of the Service by Decade, 1971-2024	73
FIGURE 62: Subjects Shot and Injured by Members of the Service by Decade, 1971-2024	73
FIGURE 63: Total Rounds Discharged by Members of the Service by Decade, 1971-2024	74
FIGURE 64: 2024 Use of Force Incidents by Members' Command	76



Data and information contained in this report are subject to change based on complaint and investigative updates.

Upholding the principles of professionalism, transparency, and accountability while serving to combat violence, improve quality of life, and free our city of disorder remains the dedicated mission of every member of the New York City Police Department (NYPD). This task, the foundation which our city's public safety is built upon, places the utmost value on human life and the dignity of every community member throughout the five boroughs.

For 180 years, these values have shaped the standards to which the women and men of the NYPD ascribe to daily while protecting our city. Since 2016, these standards have helped construct the Use of Force Report, a comprehensive annual accounting of force application by, and against, NYPD members. Documenting and investigating force incidents ensures that members abide by the highest standards of service, exercise the utmost restraint, and remain responsible for the justifiable and proper application of all uses of force. Though force may, at times, be inevitable, the largest portion of annual interactions between members of the service and the public conclude without any utilization of force.

Guided by clearly defined policies that reinforce each member's commitment to the well-being of this city, the NYPD routinely evaluates strategies in an effort to remain adaptable to community needs and provide New York City with the highest standards of public safety.

**Detective First Grade  
Jonathan E. Diller**

End of Watch: 03-25-2024

In Memoriam



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the ninth annual Use of Force Report presented by the New York City Police Department. A confirmation of the department's steadfast commitment to reducing crime and increasing safety, this report serves to reinforce the accountability and transparency that has become associated with the use, reporting, and investigation of force. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded 53 police firearm discharges in 2024, a 10.4% increase from the year prior that was fueled largely by a rise in both unintentional and unauthorized discharge categories. 2024 did, however, mark the second straight year that the department recorded a decrease in adversarial discharges, incidents when a member intentionally discharges their firearm during a confrontation with a subject. Underscoring the decrease in this critical category of discharges is 2024's increase in total arrests. While the number of arrests has, on an annual basis, risen steadily since 2021, 2024's total included the highest number of weapons arrests in this report's history. This, in addition to increases in both 911 and 311 calls for service, occurred while the department operated with a decrease in uniformed personnel for the sixth straight year. For the year, the department recorded an overall increase in force used both by, and against, members of the service. This report will provide a detailed accounting of all aspects of force, from the lowest level of physical force up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts that involved members of the service during the past year.

Representative of the NYPD's commitment to accountability is its policy in which every firearm discharge by a member of the service, whether intentional or unintentional (except for discharges that occur during firearms training or a discharge into a firearms safety station within an NYPD facility, a Department of Correction facility, or a Health and Hospitals Corporation facility) is thoroughly investigated and accounted for. In 2007, the NYPD began to publicly release the precursor to this report, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, to present a full classification of all discharge incidents, including the number of subjects and bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, unintentional discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. That report's initial collection of force data has developed into an indispensable element of the NYPD's analysis of the use of force and further underscores the department's long-standing commitment to the continuous evaluation and development of policy and practice that best serves members and the community alike.

In 2016, in conjunction with evolving force policies and the development of an improved reporting mechanism, the NYPD introduced the Use of Force Report, an enhancement of the Annual Firearms Discharge Report. The annual Use of Force Report has since progressed to consider every instance of reportable force utilized both by, and against, members of the service to provide an extensive, transparent recollection of incidents and data considered among the most critical to the department and the public alike. Detailing how, where, when, and why force is utilized provides valuable context that allows for a candid assessment, both internally and externally, of the policy, practice, and the strength of departmental training. Such thorough policies and documentation also aim to provide better context regarding force incidents and injuries in situations where force, despite all efforts of prevention by a member, remains the unavoidable outcome.

The department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual. A publicly available version of the manual, along with the NYPD Force Dashboard, are available on-line at the NYPD website, [www.nyc.gov/nypd](http://www.nyc.gov/nypd). The dashboard, a dynamic consolidation of the department's use of force data, is interactive, highly transparent, and user-friendly, providing users with data visualizations to explore the characteristics of force incidents. This includes, but is not limited to, data regarding members of the service, subjects, types of force, locations, the basis for an encounter, and injuries. Additionally, the dashboard includes legal context, insight on data collection, and details on department policy.

The department publicly releases, as appropriate, body-worn camera video and other extrinsic evidence if it may provide context and understanding of a critical incident, which often involve a firearms discharge by a member of the service or a use of force that results in the death or serious physical injury of a subject. These videos may be found at [www.youtube.com/nypd](http://www.youtube.com/nypd).

As has been detailed in previous Use of Force Reports, from 2016-2019, the types of force utilized by NYPD personnel were initially classified into three separate levels. As of October 2019, however, the department added a fourth category, making the 2020 report the first text to fully integrate the current four-level use of force policy structure.

Level 1 force consists of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, discharging Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, discharging conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) in cartridge mode, and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects. Level 2 force includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in “drive-stun” mode. Level 3 force consists of the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges. Level 4 force consists of any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 classification, though added to policy in October 2019, was not included in the 2019 Use of Force Report in order to arrange the data in a coherent manner for public consumption. Any Level 4 incident in 2019 was presented under the previous designation from the three levels of force classification system formerly in place. Due to this modification that occurred within both policy and its related data collection, the department may, going forward, adjust the manner in which comparisons of certain historical force data are made.

Directly incorporated into current NYPD force policy is a comprehensive mechanism which includes a component of both oversight and investigation. Department policy requires all levels of force to be documented on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. Level 1 force incidents, the lowest level of force, are investigated by the member’s immediate supervisor. Level 2 force incidents are investigated by department executives in the rank of captain or above. Level 3 force incidents, where physical force capable of causing death or serious physical injury was used but the subject’s injuries are not life-threatening, fall under the investigative lead of the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). The most serious incidents, Level 4 force occurrences, those of which involve police firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by the Force Investigation Division (FID). Prior to the October 2019 policy modifications, Level 4 force incidents fell within the Level 3 classification.

A use of force incident is often complex and frequently involves numerous individuals, both members of the service and subjects. The highest level of force used by any member of the service involved, or the most severe injury sustained by any subject involved, is the determining factor of the incident’s level of classification as well as any subsequent reporting and investigative requirements. While challenging, the department continuously seeks updated methods and innovations to further enhance force policy and practice. Such commitment serves to define the department’s persistence towards meeting and exceeding recognized best practices, to creating a consistent evolution of compliance with both city and state level regulations, and to continuously expand the trust and partnership of the community which the department serves.

## Firearms Discharges

**T**hough current discharge data continues to emphasize the substantial decline in discharges and related force data dating back to the onset of the department’s official recordkeeping, 2024 saw an increase in firearms discharge incidents. In 2024, the department recorded 53 firearm discharge incidents, a 10.4% increase from the previous year. While this marks the second highest annual discharge total over the last five-year period, the adversarial discharge total was the second lowest annual amount recorded during that same period. The discharge total in 2024 occurred as the department experienced an annual increase in calls for service, arrests, and arrests for weapons.

Twenty-eight discharge incidents in 2024 were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects, a decrease from 30 in 2023. One member of the service was shot and killed in an adversarial conflict in 2024, and six members were shot and injured in this category of discharge. Twenty-two subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2024: 14 sustained fatal injuries and eight sustained non-fatal injuries. In six adversarial conflict incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. Three intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2024 were the result of animal attacks, an increase from two incidents the year prior. Unintentional discharges increased from eight in 2023 to 13 in 2024. Nine firearms discharge incidents in 2024 were categorized as unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms, an increase by one incident from the total in 2023. Five unauthorized discharges were member suicides, a total that eclipses the previous year’s total of three.

## Conducted Electrical Weapons

The department experienced 1,695 CEW discharge incidents in 2024, an increase of 13.3% from the 1,496 incidents during the prior year. Of these 1,695 discharge incidents, 1,583 were intentional discharges, including 902 deployments that occurred during crime in progress situations and 353 which occurred as members were endeavoring to control an emotionally disturbed person. The remaining deployments occurred in a variety of situations including vehicle stops, wanted suspect incidents, violent prisoner interactions, and during the investigations of past crimes. There were no fatalities attributed directly to the deployment of a CEW in 2024. In 1,039 incidents, or 65.6% of the 1,583 intentional discharge incidents, the use of the CEW was deemed to be effective. Ineffective CEW discharges were attributed to several different causes, the most common included the probes falling out of the subject, probes being too far from the surface, a subject fighting through the pain, or probes missing the subject.

## Observations in NYPD Use of Force

Throughout 2024, the department recorded 11,746 total reportable force incidents— 95.3% were classified as Level 1, 3.0% as Level 2, 1.3% as Level 3, and 0.4% as Level 4. Within these 11,746 reportable force incidents, 9,793 incidents — 83.3% of the total — involved the minimal amount of reportable physical force (e.g., hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects). Additional incidents involving the utilization of force included 134 uses of OC spray, 73 uses of impact weapons, and a single police canine bite. The 11,746 total reportable force incidents represent a 20.1% increase from 2023's 9,777 total reportable force incidents.

Members of the service utilized force in 1,665 encounters with emotionally disturbed persons, which represents approximately 1.0% of the 162,961 calls for service regarding emotionally disturbed persons. The most recorded category of incident in which members utilized force was during a crime/violation in progress, an incident type that often results in the arrest of a subject; however, arrests where members used force represents approximately just 3.5% of the total amount of arrests effected by members of the NYPD. Situations involving emotionally disturbed persons and violent prisoner interactions were the next two most recorded categories of force encounters in 2024. Since 2020, these three incident types, crimes/violations in progress (which includes arrests), emotionally disturbed persons, and violent prisoner interactions have been the three most common situations, annually, in which members of the service use force.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital. During 2024, a total of 15,190 individuals were subjected to some level of force utilized by a member of the service. Of those subjects, approximately 97.1% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. 172 subjects, approximately 1.1%, were substantially injured, and 268, approximately 1.8%, were seriously injured. A total of 5,839 members of the service, approximately 20.4% of all the members that were involved in force incidents during 2024, sustained an injury. Of that number, 416, or 7.1%, of members injured during force incidents in 2024 were substantially or seriously injured.





# NYPD USE OF FORCE POLICY

## Legal Standards

**L**aw enforcement officers, in New York State and nationwide, are authorized to utilize a reasonable amount of force when encountering specific circumstances. Both federal and state law define the criteria of these circumstances and determine the extent of reasonable force.

Constitutional interpretation for the standards of police use of force was established as the result of two Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In *Garner*, the standard governing the use of deadly force was set forth, namely that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of death or serious physical injury. *Graham* established that the review of an officer's use of force must be conducted with an objective reasonableness standard. The Court wrote that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight."

"Reasonableness" as a standard is also recognized at the state level where it was central to the case of *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980). In this case, the New York State Court of Appeals observed that "it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety." *Benjamin*, like *Graham*, acknowledges the stress under which officers make life or death use of force decisions when determining the appropriateness of an officer's use of force.

## NYPD Policy

**P**rotecting human life, including the lives of individuals being placed into police custody, is the primary duty of every member of the service. NYPD policy emphasizes the value of human life, the application of reasonable force, and the utilization of less lethal alternatives. Additionally, policy prioritizes that, whenever possible, members attempt to gain a subject's safe and voluntary compliance by utilizing de-escalation techniques and thus possibly reducing or eliminating any need for force. Members of the service remain accountable for the proper use of force, responsible for applying any aspect of force in a manner consistent with both existing law and departmental policy, the latter of which is more restrictive and holds members to a higher level of restraint than either federal or state law. For instance, state law allows the use of deadly physical force in the protection of property, an application of force that is strictly prohibited under department policy.

Department policy maintains that "force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody" (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force deemed to be "unreasonable under the circumstances, it will be deemed excessive and in violation of department policy" (Patrol Guide 221-01). In this context, though the use of force is broadly defined to encompass an array of force options that a member may utilize to gain subject compliance or control, excessive force will not be tolerated. Members of the service who use excessive force will be subject to department discipline, up to and including dismissal.

A significant, often critical, goal within a law enforcement encounter is compliance, one of which is frequently accomplished through the simple and straightforward use of verbal commands. However, in situations when these commands prove insufficient or when a subject chooses to resist or ignore an officer's directions, members may employ an assortment of force options to compel a subject to submit to lawful authority. NYPD policy directs the use of de-escalation techniques "when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, which may reduce or eliminate the need to use force, and increase

the likelihood of gaining the subject's voluntary compliance." (Patrol Guide 221-02). Force options include physical force, less-lethal options (e.g., OC spray, conducted electrical weapons, or impact weapons), and even deadly physical force, when justified. Progressing consecutively from one level of force to the next is not a requirement. As an event develops, members may, for example, escalate from verbal commands to drawing a CEW or de-escalate from utilizing force to employing verbal commands.

Built upon a strategic focus prioritizing the safe and effective use of force, the NYPD firearms policy includes a comprehensive training curriculum comprising, though not limited to, tactical communications, crisis intervention, de-escalation, enhanced oversight, and a clearly defined definition of what constitutes an authorized discharge. The strength of this policy is evident—most notably when comparing the current annual totals to historical data in categories such as member discharges, subjects shot, subjects killed, and rounds discharged—and often in current annual comparisons, such as with 2024's adversarial conflict incidents marking a decline of 6.7% and 30.0% from 2023 and 2022, respectively.

The department's policy concerning the documentation of force used by, and against, members of the service was established in 2016 and has markedly developed over time. Originally comprising three levels of force, the policy has since been expanded to the current establishment of four levels, including deadly physical force, and defines the method of reporting or investigation that must follow every incident, regardless of the force level utilized. Modifications to the shape of the policy have been instituted to enhance user interface, improve accuracy, and to clearly define oversight responsibilities. These policy modifications may, however, have a bearing on the comparison between contemporary and historical force data.

## Levels of Force

### LEVEL 1

#### **(Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)**

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, wrestling/grappling with an actively resisting subject, the discharge of OC spray, the use of a mesh restraining blanket, and the use/discharge of a CEW in "cartridge mode."

### LEVEL 2

#### **(Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less-Lethal Device)**

Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (e.g., baton, other equipment, vehicle, etc.), a police canine bite, and the use/discharge of a CEW in "drive stun" mode.

### LEVEL 3

#### **(Use of Deadly Physical Force, except Firearm Discharge)**

Level 3 includes the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, other than a firearms discharge.

### LEVEL 4

#### **(Firearm Discharge)**

Level 4 includes any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 was introduced into policy in October 2019 and was not included in the reporting data until 2020.

### **NON-REPORTABLE USES OF FORCE**

Actions that are not reportable uses of force include: ordering a person to lie on the ground; guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner; or the mere use of equipment such as Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects, unless an injury is sustained.




Figure 1

## Injuries and Force Categories

**T**he degree to which a subject or bystander sustains an injury, resulting from police action, can elevate the categorization of the incident and determine its classification and investigation as a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 use of force.

Physical injuries to subjects, such as minor swelling, contusions, lacerations, abrasions, and complaints of substantial pain, are categorized as Level 1 force incidents.

Physical injuries that are consistent with the application of Level 2 force (e.g., unconsciousness, the loss of a tooth, lacerations requiring stitches or staples) will elevate an incident to Level 2. An allegation or suspicion of excessive force whether an injury is apparent or not, the attempted suicide of a prisoner whether or not injury is apparent, or the use of any prohibited act, other than the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint, will also result in a Level 2 classification.

Serious physical injuries that result in a Level 3 classification include but are not limited to: broken/fractured bones, injuries requiring hospital admission, heart attacks, strokes, aneurysms, or other life-threatening/serious illnesses and injuries. Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or a prohibited method of restraint, alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide of a prisoner that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification.

Any death or serious injury that has a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will result in a Level 4 classification.

## Force Investigation and Review

**T**he department's force review process includes robust internal oversight processes. The NYPD's use of force oversight and management controls include:

### **IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR**

The immediate supervisor is an available supervisor, not involved in the incident, assigned to the same command as the member involved in a force incident. The immediate supervisor must be at least one rank higher than all members involved. Should a supervisor of an appropriate rank not be available, the duty captain will determine who will assume the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. Level 1 uses of force are investigated by immediate supervisors.

### **DUTY CAPTAIN**

The duty captain is the front-line executive, supervising all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during the hours when a commanding officer/executive officer are not present. In the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer of a command, the duty captain will investigate Level 2 uses of force.

### **DUTY CHIEF**

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD. The duty chief assumes command of an incident when no member of a higher rank is on scene, acts as a representative of the Chief of Department, and responds to serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved firearms discharges and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in force investigations during hours when command and borough executives are not present.

### **INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU- INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

Geographically assigned units, within the Internal Affairs Bureau, that investigate allegations of minor misconduct and violations of department regulations. The duty captain may call upon the investigations units to assist on Level 2 force investigations.

### **FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER**

The First Deputy Commissioner, the second highest ranking member of the department, oversees numerous units, including those with a direct association with the review and/or investigation of force. These include the Force Investigation Division, responsible for investigating the most serious force incidents, the Department Advocate's Office, which prosecutes administrative disciplinary cases within the department, and the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD's internal discipline trials.

Additionally, the First Deputy Commissioner chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews all Level 4 uses of force, determines whether the involved member's actions were within policy, and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commissioner when uses of force fall outside departmental policy.

#### **INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU (IAB)**

IAB serves as the recipient of all allegations of misconduct involving members of the service and seeks to combat police corruption by analyzing allegations, examining trends, and conducting comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. All incidents categorized as a Level 3 use of force fall under the investigative responsibility of IAB.

#### **FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION (FID)**

All Level 4 incidents, defined as incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service and incidents in which subjects/bystanders have died or are seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by FID. Additionally, this unit reviews the tactics utilized within each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and identify training recommendations for all members of the service as well as specifically for the individual members involved in discharge incidents.

#### **LEGAL BUREAU/PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS DIVISION**

The Legal Bureau oversees the department's liaison with the New York City Department of Investigation, the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD, and other governmental agencies as required. The Professional Standards Division works to assess individual and institutional compliance with departmental policy, law, and external oversight to develop and implement risk reduction outcomes and provides internal oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. Additionally, this unit is responsible for ensuring the department's complete and proper implementation of court-ordered reforms.

The Legal Bureau and the Chief of Department lead Compliance-Stat meetings with borough and division personnel, the purpose of which includes, but is not limited to, the assessment of compliance with regards to force policies and to ensure force investigations remain both thorough and timely.

#### **DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT ADVOCATE**

The Department Advocate's Office conducts administrative prosecutions of employees of the New York City Police Department for violations of the department's rules, regulations, and procedures, and provides the First Deputy Commissioner with recommendations concerning suspensions and restorations to duty of department personnel. Attorneys provide legal guidance to investigative units, analyze department investigations, draft charges and specifications, negotiate and submit case dispositions for the Police Commissioner's review, and litigate disciplinary matters before the Deputy Commissioner of Trials.

#### **DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, TRIALS**

The Deputy Commissioner, Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, renders written findings of fact, and provides recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

#### **USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD**

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board convenes to review the most serious force cases and render determinations regarding the actions of members during force encounters.

## **Training**

**D**epartment training provides the structure to cultivate and enhance members' critical decision-making regarding force incidents, or any other aspect of policing members face daily. Training programs and curriculum are continuously assessed and, whenever necessary, revised as the result of, among others, data analysis, local or state legislative modifications, tactical enhancements, and innovations within the technological field.

#### **TRAINING BUREAU**


The Training Bureau provides members and recruits with the latest academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members routinely includes instruction concerning significant tactical and de-escalation innovations and strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, modifications of law and department procedure, and guidance regarding the effective means to cultivate and reinforce positive community interactions, communications, and collaboration.

Beginning as a recruit at the academy, each member of the service is required to complete a rigorous firearms training course and must re-qualify annually, for the entirety of their career, for the use of their service and any authorized off-duty weapons. This training, aimed to develop functional skills along with incisive tactical decisions, incorporates practical knowledge, situational awareness, critical thinking, and weapons proficiency, each of which are a vital asset in the effort to minimize force and ensure safety. Due to the nature of their assignments, members within specialized units, including, but not limited to, the Emergency Service Unit or the Strategic Response Group, receive additional firearms training specific to their duty.

The principal goal of every member of the NYPD, as emphasized in policy as well as in firearms and any use of force training, is simply to protect life, including the lives of individuals being placed in police custody. This includes the life of any victim, bystander, subject or member of the service. Circumstances occur, however, that in order to protect life, the utilization of force, up to and including deadly force, becomes necessary. The determination of when and how to use deadly force relies on the member's perception of the situation in concert with a host of factors. These factors, which are often accompanied by critical urgency, include the overall circumstances of the incident, situational ability, existing law, department policy, and training. Members of the service are trained to utilize deadly physical force in order to "stop the threat," a term meaning to end a subject's ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To achieve this outcome within a situation as dynamic as a firearms discharge, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. The arms and legs of a subject are more uncertain targets. Both are frequently smaller, less static, and a firearms strike in either extremity holds a diminished probability of stopping the potentially deadly actions of a subject.

Use of force training originates while recruits attend the Police Academy and incorporates an assortment of academic lessons, physical training, and tactical instruction. Academically, recruits are required to successfully complete the Use of Force chapter of the Academy's Law curriculum which focuses on the justifiable use of force as per the New York State Penal Law as well as departmental standards as reflected in policy. With its specific emphasis on encounters that may require the application of force, de-escalation, approved force options, or any combination thereof, recruits apply this chapter's lesson into the credible, realistic, and rapidly-paced situations they encounter during scenario-based-training. Using training exercises such as this allows recruits to apply classroom teaching into a practical demonstration of proper tactics and provides an opportunity to evaluate techniques. Providing recruits with an environment that combines current legal issues and departmental policy with established best practices and tactical innovations, delivers an optimal learning experience for recruits who, upon graduation, are likely to be detailed to patrol duty, an assignment that consists of a high volume of public enforcement, engagement, and interaction.

While within the academy as a recruit, members undergo a physical and tactical training curriculum that contains an assortment of force-related courses of instruction. Among them are the Use of Force course, which focuses on force options under varying circumstances, and instruction based on case law, which seeks to provide recruits with the capability to streamline force decision making. In addition to lectures focused on relevant topics such as critical decision making and the Fourth Amendment, recruits are trained and certified in the use of both firearms and less lethal weapons and receive approximately 50 hours of physical training comprising force tactics that include strikes, takedowns, defensive drills, handcuffing, and proper methods of restraint.



# FIREARMS DISCHARGES

## Overview

The use of force is a critical aspect of law enforcement and is a paramount aspect of accountability and transparency within policing. The proper application of force is exceptional in that it is used for both the protection of life, and the legally-justifiable taking of life. Of the innumerable variables that surround each of these sudden, intense, and often volatile incidents, every police firearms discharge brings with it a significant potential for trauma and conflict, impacting all members of the service, the public, and the relationship shared among the two.

Aspects of this relationship are continuously cultivated through daily interactions and events requiring member response, such as the approximately 19,100 daily 911 calls for service and 4,100 311 service requests. Beyond these calls for service are countless other interactions, some planned and others spontaneous that, while requiring neither the application of force nor any documentation, still help shape the health of the department's relationship with the community. Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of 2024's interactions between members and the public occurred without any use of force by a member of the service.

The evolution of the department's commitment towards effectively utilizing firearm statistics began more than 50 years ago when, in 1971, the department began to officially collect discharge data and track these incidents. The creation of this statistical engine established a foundation for a firearms policy that continues to improve today by way of procedural updates, training improvements, technological advancements, and resource upgrades. The early data collection also led to the eventual development of the Annual Firearms Discharge Report in 2007, this report's predecessor, as a publicly available resource detailing the department's annual discharge incidents.

Annual reporting evolved together with policy, culminating with the introduction of the first publication of the current Use of Force Report. Coinciding with a significant update to the department's force policy and data capture, the report expanded beyond simply firearms discharges to include all aspects of reportable force used by, and against, members of the service.

The 53 firearms discharge incidents in 2024 represent a 10.4% increase from the previous year. While any annual increase in discharge incidents is significant, the department's commitment to comprehensive and effective policing remains resolute. With a focus on safety, restraint, and de-escalation, members of the service use force while firmly guided by the intent to protect and preserve human life. Additionally, it is worth noting the categories of discharges that fueled the annual increase, something that is further discussed within this report.

Every firearm discharge incident, irrespective of the category, cause, or circumstance, is meticulously investigated by the department. Intended to provide a transparent and accountable understanding of all facets of each individual incident, these investigations collectively seek to identify areas of improvement for policy, practice, and resources to further serve the department and the public alike. The discharge data within this report has been compiled from the department's Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, arrest and complaint reports, medical examiner's reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annually publicly reported force data, the NYPD Force Dashboard, previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports and prior Use of Force Reports. The department recognizes the value that a critical analysis of all police firearms discharges may elicit. However, the relatively small amount of discharges the department experiences on an annual basis may limit the scope of conclusions that may be elicited or trends that may be forecasted.

Firearms discharges by members of the service, including those that are legally-justifiable, are still the subject of a comprehensive review by the department for procedural violations, tactical deviations, and for any factors that may suggest the need to modify current policy or procedure. If a determination is made, upon the review of a discharge incident, to impose discipline, the discipline may not necessarily result from the actions of the actual discharge but rather from a violation of other departmental procedures within the scope of the event.

Every member who discharges their firearm in a discharge incident, regardless of the circumstances of the incident, is required to attend a firearms tactical review session conducted by the Training Bureau's Firearms and Tactics Section.

## Discharge Categories

The NYPD classifies police firearms discharges as follows:

### **INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE-ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT (ID-AC)**

An ID-AC incident occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 28 ID-AC incidents that occurred in 2024.

### **INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE-ANIMAL ATTACK (ID-AA)**

An ID-AA incident occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were three ID-AA incidents that occurred in 2024.

### **UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE**

This category of discharge occurs when a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were 13 unintentional discharge incidents in 2024.

### **UNAUTHORIZED DISCHARGE**

This category of discharge occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of their employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member's firearm. There were nine unauthorized discharge incidents in 2024, five of which were member suicides.

Historical Snapshot 2016-2024									
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Adversarial Conflict	37	23	17	25	25	36	40	30	28
Animal Attack	11	9	4	6	2	5	3	2	3
Unintentional Discharge	14	12	8	8	10	4	11	8	13
Unauthorized Discharge	10	8	6	13	6	7	8	8	9
<b>Total Discharges</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>53</b>

Figure 2

The department may also categorize a discharge into the following two categories:

### **MISTAKEN IDENTITY**

This category of discharge occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm at another member in the mistaken belief that the other member is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity firearms incidents do not include crossfires, when a member inadvertently strikes another member of the service while discharging at a different subject.

### **INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE-NO CONFLICT**

This category of discharge occurs when a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance.

Neither of these categories of discharge occurred in 2024. Due to the infrequency of which these two categories have taken place, the last of which transpired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, both categories are commonly absent from the annual report.

As previously stated, the department officially began to track the number of police firearm discharge incidents in 1971. During that first decade of recordkeeping, 5,074 discharge incidents were recorded, 994 of which occurred in 1972 alone, highlighting the stark contrast to the annual totals recorded in more recent years and underscoring the department's progression towards an emphasis on restraint and accountability.

Even that decade's lowest annual total, 379 discharges in 1976, remains significantly higher than any annual total recorded in the last 25 years and surpasses the overall amount of discharge incidents recorded over the last five years combined.




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7

New York City Police Department  
Firearms Discharge Incidents by Decade  
1971-2024




Figure 8

### Intentional Discharges-Adversarial Conflict

**F**orty-two members of the NYPD intentionally discharged their weapons in adversarial conflicts during 2024. This total, which represents approximately 0.12% of the department's 2024 average of 33,705 uniformed members, is also the fewest number of discharging members recorded in intentional discharge-adversarial conflict (ID-AC) incidents over the last six-year period and the third lowest annual total since this report began in 2016. The decrease of two discharging members from the year prior within this category of incident coincides with the department's sixth consecutive annual decline in uniformed staffing totals.

Since 2016, the department has averaged approximately 29 ID-AC incidents annually. Within these incidents during that period, roughly 0.1% of the department's annual average of approximately 35,248 members intentionally discharged their firearms in an ID-AC incident. In 2024 the ID-AC total not only falls below the annual average but also represents the second consecutive yearly reduction in ID-AC incidents, the second such two-year decrease (2017-2018) that has occurred in the history of this report.

In 2024, members of the service responded to more than 6.9 million 911 calls for service, a 2.3% increase from the previous year and the second highest annual total in the history of this report. Calls for service related to weapons totaled 73,588 in 2024, down 3.2% from the previous year to mark the lowest annual total dating back to 2021. Arrests increased by 14.8% from the year prior, amounting to 260,503 in 2024. This represents the department's highest annual total since 2017 and includes 43,916 arrests for weapons, the highest year-end total of weapons arrests in this report's history. Gun arrests totaled 4,126 in 2024, though a 7.2% decrease from 2023, this still represents the fifth straight consecutive year in which the department recorded more than 4,100 arrests within this particular category.

Consistently adapting to emerging responsibilities and challenges, the NYPD remains dedicated to ensuring the safety of all New Yorkers and, to that end, continues to deploy resources focused on gun violence in a proactive effort to identify and arrest individuals who choose to illegally carry or shoot guns in our community. This focus occurs alongside the many thousands of additional interactions that members of the service experience with the public annually. Often fraught with unpredictable risks and a possibility for volatility, these interactions include such daily occurrences as investigative encounters, vehicle stops, the response to calls for a person in crisis, and the escorting the thousands of such individuals safely to hospitals and care facilities.

Despite this, the overwhelming majority of public encounters and engagements, including those in which a uniformed member placed an armed subject or a person in crisis into custody, occurred without any members of the service discharging their firearms.

In 2024, the department recorded 28 ID-AC incidents involving 42 members of the service who intentionally discharged their firearms. As a consequence of these incidents, one member of service was shot and killed, and six members were shot and injured by subject gunfire. The year-end totals of these two categories represent an increase of one and three, respectively, as compared to 2023, marking the first time since the creation of this report that the department experienced an annual increase in both categories together during the same calendar year.

Overall, since 2016, only twice had the department experienced an annual increase in members shot and killed. Separately, members shot and injured had risen from the year prior in four different years. However, prior to 2024, never had both categories experienced an increase in the same year.

The adversarial conflicts in 2024 included 29 subjects, six of whom discharged firearms at members of the service. Among these 29 ID-AC subjects, 22 were shot by members of the service, 14 of whom died.

### **Members of the Service Deaths**

**D**one member of the service, then-Police Officer Jonathan Diller, was shot and killed as the result of an ID-AC incident in 2024. Police Officer Diller and additional members of the service were conducting a stop of a vehicle when a subject within the vehicle, who refused to comply with a lawful order, discharged a firearm, striking and fatally wounding Officer Diller. In response, a member of the service discharged their firearm, striking and injuring the subject. Police Officer Diller was posthumously promoted to the rank of Detective First Grade.

### **Members of the Service Injuries**

**E**ight members of the service were injured as a result of six separate ID-AC incidents in 2024. Of the eight injured, six were struck by subject gunfire in four separate incidents. In one incident, a subject gained possession of a member's firearm and discharged it, injuring two members of the service.

In another incident, a subject resisting a lawful apprehension produced a firearm and discharged it, shooting and injuring two members of the service. In two separate ID-AC occurrences, two members of the service were shot and injured during an exchange of gunfire with armed subjects.

Of the remaining two members who were injured in ID-AC incidents, one member was shot and injured from "friendly fire" during one incident and the remaining member injury occurred when a member was struck and injured by a vehicle operated by a subject fleeing a traffic stop.

### **Subject Deaths**

**T**he total number of ID-AC incidents, and consequently, the number of subjects involved, vary annually. Since this report began, however, the department has experienced an average of 29 such incidents each year. While 2024's incident total falls slightly below the annual average, the number of subjects shot and killed in ID-AC incidents amounted to 14, a number that is exactly half of all incidents during the year as well as the highest annual total in this report's history. Since the inception of this report, 32.2% of ID-AC incidents have resulted in a subject shot and killed by a member of the service.

All 14 subjects who died by police gunfire in an ID-AC in 2024 possessed a weapon that appeared capable of causing death or serious injury. Seven subjects possessed loaded firearms, six subjects possessed cutting instruments, and the remaining one subject possessed an imitation firearm. All 14 ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are further detailed in Appendix B.

## Subject Injuries

**M**arking the second lowest annual total since the department began tracking firearms incidents, 2024's eight subjects shot and injured by a police firearm discharge during an ID-AC incident is an 11.1% decrease from the previous year. This marks the lowest annual total since 2020 and falls below the approximate average of 12 subjects injured in ID-AC incidents yearly since 2016.

These eight subject injuries occurred in eight separate incidents. Five incidents consisted of subjects armed with loaded firearms, four of which were discharged at members of the service. The remaining three incidents each consisted of a subject in possession of a cutting instrument.

Of the five subject injury ID-AC incidents during which subjects were armed with a firearm, the first incident occurred when, as members were conducting a stop of a vehicle, a subject refused to comply with a lawful order then discharged a firearm, striking and fatally wounding then-Police Officer Jonathan Diller. In response, a member of the service on scene discharged their firearm, striking and injuring the subject.

The next incident occurred as members attempted to place a subject into custody for assault. The subject resisted and a struggle ensued, during which the subject gained possession of a member's firearm and discharged it, injuring two members of the service. In response, additional members

at the scene discharged their firearms striking and injuring the subject.

The third incident took place when a subject operating an unregistered scooter fled on foot from an attempted stop. Members pursued and caught up to the subject who resisted apprehension, and a struggle ensued. During the struggle, the subject produced a firearm from a fanny-pack and discharged it, shooting and injuring two members of the service. In response, a member returned fire, striking and injuring the subject.

Incident number four occurred as members responded to a 911 call for service regarding a dispute involving a firearm. As members canvassed, they encountered the subject who produced a firearm from their waistband and pointed it in their direction, prompting the members to discharge their firearms, striking and injuring the subject.

The remaining incident involved two subjects and took place in connection with a ShotSpotter activation, a technology that pinpoints the sound of gunfire with real-time locations and alerts members of the service to respond to the scene. One subject was shot and injured and one subject shot and killed, both of which were attributed to a police firearms discharge. Due to the subject fatality, this incident is further detailed in Appendix B.

Three subject injury ID-AC incidents occurred when subjects were shot and injured while brandishing cutting instruments. One incident occurred when members encountered a

## 2024 Adversarial Conflicts in Context

6.9 Million	53	29
Calls for Service	Total Firearms Discharge Incidents	ID-AC Subjects Fired Upon by Police
1.5 Million	42	22
311 Service Requests	UMOS Involved in Adversarial Conflicts	Total ID-AC Subjects Shot
33,705	28	14
Uniformed Members of the Service (UMOS)	Adversarial Conflicts	ID-AC Subjects Shot & Killed
260,503	6	
Arrests	ID-AC Subjects Fired at UMOS	
162,961	1	
Calls for Emotionally Disturbed Persons	UMOS Shot & Killed by an ID-AC Subject	
73,588	6	
Weapons Calls	UMOS Shot & Injured by ID-AC Subjects	
4,126		
Gun Arrests		

Figure 9




Figure 10

subject armed with a knife while in a dispute and chasing another individual. The subject refused commands to drop the knife, prompting two members to separately deploy conducted electrical weapons. Both were ineffective and, after the second deployment, the subject attempted to stab a member of the service. In response, one member discharged their firearm, striking and injuring the subject.

The second incident took place when members responded to a 911 call for service for a family dispute and encountered the subject who was agitated and uncooperative. The subject fled to a rear bedroom of the location, returned with a machete, and attempted to swing it at the members on scene. In response, one member discharged their firearm striking and injuring the subject.

The third incident occurred when members encountered a subject brandishing a knife. After the subject refused orders to drop the knife, two members deployed their conducted electrical weapons, both of which were ineffective. Then while still brandishing the knife, the subject charged toward a member of the service before turning towards the other member, prompting the members to discharge their firearms, shooting and injuring the subject.

### Bystander Injuries

**B**ystanders may also incur injuries in relation to an ID-AC incident. This unfortunate outcome may occur as a direct result of, or in relation to, police action during adversarial conflict incidents. Four bystanders suffered injuries as the result of three separate ID-AC incidents in 2024. In one incident, two bystanders were shot and injured when members discharged their firearms at a subject armed with a knife.

In the next incident, a bystander suffered an injury to their back as members discharged their firearms at a subject brandishing a firearm. The remaining incident occurred when a bystander was shot and injured as members discharged their firearms at a subject armed with a firearm.

As the respective subjects in these two incidents were both shot and killed as the result of a police firearms discharge, both incidents are further detailed in Appendix B.

## Additional Considerations

**A**ll 28 ID-AC incidents that occurred in 2024 involved an actual or perceived weapon or dangerous instrument. In 14 separate incidents, the weapon or dangerous instrument utilized was a firearm, 12 of which were semiautomatic pistols, one was a revolver, and one was an imitation firearm.

In 13 of these 14 incidents, the firearms possessed by the subjects were determined to be loaded and capable of discharging live rounds at the time of each respective incident. This includes an unrecovered firearm, as substantiated by ballistic evidence collected at the scene. The remaining incident, as previously stated, involved an imitation firearm.

Ten separate ID-AC incidents involved subjects in possession of cutting instruments, eight incidents in which the subject possessed a knife, one incident in which the subject possessed a machete, and one incident during which the subject possessed scissors.

The four remaining ID-AC incidents involved a subject operating a vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious physical injury to members of the service and/or bystanders on the scene.

There were a total of 29 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents during 2024: 28 known subjects and one unknown subject. Of the 28 known subjects, 27 were male, one was female, and they ranged in age from 19 to 65 with a median age of 32. Of all 28 known subjects, 60.7% were between the ages of 21 and 39, 21.4% were under the age of 21, and 17.9% were aged 40 or older. Otherwise stated, 17 subjects were between the ages of 21 and 39, six were under the age of 21, and five were 40 years of age or older.

Threat Type in ID-AC Incidents, 2024




Figure 11

Gunfire in New York City, 2024




Figure 12

The race and ethnicity of the 28 known ID-AC subjects was determined by the subject's self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, eyewitness reports, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and additional available sources. The 28 known ID-AC subjects in 2024's ID-AC incidents included 17 who were Black, nine who were Hispanic, one who was White, and one who was Asian. Expressed as percentages, 60.7% of ID-AC subjects were Black, 32.1% were Hispanic, 3.6% were Asian, and 3.6% were White.

### Race/Ethnicity of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects vs. Known Criminal Shooting Victims vs. Known ID-AC Subjects, 2024




Figure 13

In general, the racial and ethnic composition of ID-AC subjects comparatively corresponds to the 608 known criminal shooting suspects associated with the 904 occurrences of criminal shootings that took place in 2024. Among the 608 identified criminal shooting suspects, approximately 64.5% were Black, 32.9% were Hispanic, 1.6% were Asian, and 1.0% were White. Of 2024's 1,101 criminal shooting victims in 2024, 66.7% were Black, 29.1% were Hispanic, 2.8% were Asian/other, 1.2% were White, and 0.2% were unknown.

### Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2024




Figure 14

Forty-two members of the service intentionally discharged their firearms in an ID-AC incident in 2024. Thirty-nine of those members were male and the remaining three members were female. The NYPD's uniformed staff, taken as an average over the course of 2024, was approximately 78.9% male, 21.0% female, and 0.1% non-binary, other, or unknown. Of the members of the service involved in 2024's ID-AC incidents, 33.3% were White, 45.2% were Hispanic, 14.3% were Black, and 7.2% Asian.

### Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents vs. Department Staffing, 2024




Figure 15

Within the department's rank structure, members serving in the rank of police officer account for close to two-thirds of all uniformed personnel. Members in this rank, as well as those less-senior members who have fewer years of service, are among the likeliest staff to be serving in a patrol-related function. As the department's frontline to ensure the safety of the residents, workers, and visitors of New York City, patrol service has, by nature, the prospect of an abundance of public interactions and engagements. Performing such critical patrol duties as responding to service calls, conducting enforcement, and addressing quality of life concerns increases the unpredictability, volume, and range of encounters members in this assignment face daily and raises the possibility of confronting situations that may result in an adversarial conflict.




Figure 16

Of the 28 ID-AC incidents that took place in 2024, 85.7%, or 24, took place in relation to the member's performance of patrol duties, including six instances in relation to a vehicle stop. Of the remaining four incidents, two occurred in relation to members effecting of a warrant and two incidents transpired with relation to the members performance of a non-patrol related investigation. All ID-AC incidents in 2024 occurred while the involved members were on-duty.

During these 24 patrol-related ID-AC occurrences, 36 members of the service discharged their firearms, an amount that accounts for 85.7% of all the discharging members in adversarial conflicts for the year. Of these 36 members, 86.1%, or 31, held the rank of police officer of which 83.9% had accumulated ten years of service or less at the time of their respective discharge incident. The remaining five members involved in patrol-related ID-AC incidents consisted of four sergeants and one detective.

Overall, the discharging members in 2024's 28 ID-AC incidents included 32 members in the rank of police officer, five in the rank of detective, four in the rank of sergeant, and one member in the rank of lieutenant. Since the inception of this report, members in the rank of police officer have made up more than 60% of the department annually while accounting for more than 72% of all discharging members in ID-AC occurrences during that same period. In 2024, members in the rank of police officer represented 63.6% of the department and 76.2% of members discharging their firearm in an adversarial conflict.

Members in the rank of detective represented the second largest portion, more than 15%, of the department's personnel in 2024. Similarly, members in this rank accounted for the second largest percentage of discharging members, both in 2024 and in this report's history, with totals of 11.9% and 12.5%, respectively.

Members in the rank of sergeant followed next, accounting for the third highest percentage of discharging ID-AC members, both in 2024 and in the history of this report, representing 9.5% and 12.0%, respectively. Members in this rank accounted for 13.3% of department personnel in 2024.

Rounding out 2024's discharging ID-AC personnel was one member in the rank of lieutenant. This rank, which made up 5.2% of uniformed members in 2024, accounted for 2.4% of discharging members for the year, an amount comparable to the annual average for this rank, as it has accounted for approximately 2.7% of discharging members in ID-AC incidents since the creation of this report. No rank beyond lieutenant was responsible for an ID-AC discharge in 2024.

Of the 42 total members of the service involved in the 28 ID-AC incidents in 2024, 71.4%, 30 members, had 10 years or less of service time with the NYPD at the time of their respective incident. Of these members, 27 held the rank of police officer, two held the rank of detective, and one held the rank of sergeant.

Seventeen ID-AC incidents in 2024, 60.7% of the total, involved just a single member who discharged their firearm. Eight incidents, accounting for 28.6% of all occurrences, involved two discharging members and the remaining 10.7% of incidents included three members who discharged their firearms. No incident in 2024 included more than three discharging members of the service.

Seven members of the service were shot by subject gunfire in five ID-AC incidents in 2024. Four of these incidents contained just a single discharging member of the service, including the incident that resulted in the fatal shooting of Detective Jonathan Diller, as well as three separate incidents that resulted in four members being shot and injured. The remaining incident, which resulted in two members being shot and injured, involved three discharging members of the service.

In 24 of the 28 ID-AC incidents that took place during 2024, the involved members—36 in total—were attired in uniform and performing patrol-related duties. In the remaining four incidents, the six involved members were attired in plainclothes. Four of these members—three detectives and a police officer—were, in two separate incidents, attempting to execute a warrant. The two remaining members, a lieutenant and a detective, were performing investigative functions in two separate incidents.

Thirty-three members who discharged their firearms during an ID-AC occurrence in 2024 were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau, a total that represents 78.6% of all members in ID-AC incidents. Six members, representing 14.3%, were assigned to the Detective Bureau, two members, 4.8%, were assigned to the Housing Bureau, and the remaining one member, 2.3%, was assigned to Special Operations.




Figure 17

The first platoon, the hours between 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m., experienced 12 ID-AC incidents in 2024, the highest total for the year and just the third time in this report's history that the third platoon did not lead in this category. Ten incidents occurred during the third platoon, between the hours of 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. and six incidents took place during the second platoon, between the hours of 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.

Overall, since 2016, 45.2% of all adversarial conflicts took place on the third platoon, 32.6% on the first platoon, and 22.2% on the second platoon.

More than two-thirds of all ID-AC incidents in 2024 occurred in just two of the five boroughs. Brooklyn, with ten incidents, and Queens with nine, accounted for 67.8% of adversarial conflicts for the year, followed by Manhattan with four (14.3%), the Bronx with three (10.7%), one in Staten Island (3.6%), and one incident that took place beyond the confines of the city in New Jersey. While three boroughs did experience increases from the year prior, adversarial conflicts declined in both Staten Island and the Bronx, the latter of which decreased by 75.0%, from 12 to just three incidents. This is notable as it marks, during the history of this report, the largest annual incident reduction for any borough in addition to being the lowest annual total to occur in the Bronx.

Adversarial conflict discharge incidents in 2024 took place in 19 separate precincts across New York City, a 9.5% decrease from 2023 when ID-ACs occurred in 21 separate precincts. Seven precincts experienced multiple ID-AC incidents, the same annual total as both 2022 and 2023. In 2024, neither Staten Island nor the Bronx had a multiple ID-AC precinct. While this has been a continuous trend for Staten Island, which last had a multiple ID-AC precinct in 2018, 2024 marked the first time since 2017 that the Bronx did not have any precinct experience more than just a single ID-AC incident during the calendar year.

Both Queens and Brooklyn had three multiple ID-AC precincts in 2024, accounting for seven and six incidents, respectively. The 115th Precinct in Queens had the highest individual total for the year with three incidents followed by two each in the 101st and 103rd Precincts. Brooklyn's 67th, 73rd, and 75th Precincts experienced two incidents each and the remaining multiple incident command was Manhattan's 23rd Precinct with two occurrences for the year. The year 2024 marked the second consecutive year with only one three ID-AC command for the calendar year.

ID-AC Incidents by Platoon, 2024




Figure 18

## ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Borough, 2024




Figure 19

Dating back to the creation of this report in 2016, Brooklyn has accounted for the highest percentage of ID-AC incidents, recording 32.2% of all incidents. The Bronx followed, responsible for 27.3% of ID-ACs, then Queens with 18.7%, Manhattan with 15.0%, and Staten Island with 3.4% of incidents. The remaining portion of incidents, 3.4% of the total, took place beyond the geographical confines of New York City.

Over that same period, 2016-2024, 12 separate precincts across the city did not record an ID-AC incident and another 15 precincts recorded just a single incident. Of these precincts, two experienced their first ID-AC in 2024, while two others last experienced an ID-AC in 2016. Combined, these 27 precincts represent 35.0% of the NYPD's total precinct count. It should be noted that this statistic does not include the 116th Precinct in Queens, the department's first newly created precinct in over ten years. This precinct, which opened late in the calendar year of 2024, encompasses an area previously designated within either the 105th or the 113th Precinct.

Since 2016, eight precincts, the Bronx's 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 47th, and 52nd Precincts along with Brooklyn's 67th, 73rd, and 75th Precincts, have accounted for 29.8% of all ID-AC incidents within New York City's five boroughs though they represent just 10.4% of the city's total precinct count. When combined with the ID-AC totals from two additional precincts, the Bronx's 40th and Queens' 103rd, these ten precincts, while representing 13.0% of all precincts, have recorded more than one-third of the department's adversarial discharge incidents during the last nine-year period.

Adversarial conflict firearms discharges tend to occur in areas of New York City where greater levels of criminal gun violence take place. Since 2007, when the department began to map police discharges and criminal shootings in this report's predecessor, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, the "Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges-Adversarial Conflicts" maps have shown a general consistency of geographical correlation between adversarial discharge incidents and criminal gun violence. As shown on the map on the following page, the frequency and locations of 2024's ID-AC incidents are comparable to New York City's criminal gun activity and criminal shooting incidents during that same timeframe.

Uniformed members of the service discharged a total of 150 rounds during ID-AC incidents in 2024, the second lowest annual total in this report's history, for a 14.3% reduction from the previous year and the second straight annual decline in this category. Since 2016, the department has averaged approximately 243 rounds discharged within ID-AC incidents annually, which 2024's total falls significantly below. Two incidents in 2024 equaled each other for the most rounds discharged per incident, 19 in each, for a combined 38 rounds in the two incidents. As compared to each of the last two years, 2024 falls well below both 2023 and 2022 when the total of the two incidents with the highest number of rounds discharged in those years were 56 and 179, respectively. The two incidents with the highest number of rounds discharged in 2024 also account for two subjects shot and killed as well as one subject shot and injured.

In 19 of 2024's 28 ID-AC incidents, the total number of rounds discharged by the involved members were between one and five. These 19 incidents, involving 22 members who discharged a total of 50 rounds, accounted for 67.9% of this year's adversarial conflict incidents, the second highest annual percentage of this discharge grouping within ID-AC incidents in the history of this report.

Since this report's creation in 2016, the majority, 61.0%, of all adversarial conflict incidents have involved between just one and five rounds discharged by the involved members of the service.

Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges  
Adversarial Conflicts, 2024




Figure 20

Rounds Discharged per ID-AC Incident, 2024




Figure 21

Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AC Incidents, 2024




Figure 22

### Objective Completion Rate

When discussing ID-AC incidents, the “objective completion rate” is how the department determines the effectiveness of a police firearms discharge. When a member of the service properly and lawfully perceives a threat serious enough to necessitate the use of a firearm and discharges a firearm properly and lawfully at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether the member ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of rounds discharged at a particular subject. The objective is considered completed when the actions of the subject, specifically those actions that threaten imminent serious physical injury or death are stopped by a member’s use of deadly physical force. The objective completion rate is used for statistical and informational purposes and is not a factor considered in the investigation of individual incidents. The department does not calculate a “hit percentage” when describing an ID-AC incident, in part because the percentages are sometimes unknown (for example, in cases when a subject flees) and because of the widely differing circumstances in individual incidents.

By discharging their firearms and striking at least one subject, members of the service successfully stopped the threat in 22 of 28 ID-AC incidents in 2024, for an objective completion rate of 78%. This is 25% higher than the previous year and marks the largest one-year percentage increase in the history of this report. It should be noted, however, as the subjects in two incidents fled, were not apprehended and may have been struck by the members’ firearms discharge, 2024’s objective completion rate may be higher than reported.

Objective Completion Rate, 2016-2024



Figure 23

## Shooting Distance

**I**nvestigations resulting from adversarial discharge incidents determined the distance of 38 of 42 discharging members in relation to the respective subjects during the occurrence of their ID-AC incidents. Twenty-four members discharged their weapons at a distance of 15 feet or less from their target subjects, including five members who discharged their weapon from five feet or less. Fourteen members were determined to be at a distance of more than 15 feet from their subject at the time of discharge.

Uniformed members of the service are trained to discharge their weapon at a target from a distance as far away as 75 feet. However, given the exigency of any adversarial conflict, irrespective of the distance, such close-contact situations elevate the already intense demand for instantaneous, life-or-death decisions by each involved member of the service. Such decisions are likely to be accompanied by just a momentary timeframe for a member to determine whether or not to discharge their firearm.




Figure 24

## Intentional Discharges-Animal Attack

**I**he NYPD, in policy and through their collaboration with the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), are responsible for properly investigating complaints of animal abuse as well as being tasked with acting upon dangerous animal conditions. While any encounter a member faces may carry the potential for a myriad of challenges, the inclusion of an animal in any circumstance adds an element often fraught with unpredictability and an additional threat. Members respond to thousands of animal-specific calls for service on an annual basis, though, for the basis of this report, only instances involving a police firearms discharge are discussed within this text.

In 2024, the department experienced three Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA) incidents. In all three incidents, members were responding to 911 calls for service regarding a vicious dog. Policy permits members to discharge a firearm at a dog or other animal only to protect a member of the service or others present from imminent physical injury and there is no opportunity to retreat or other reasonable means to eliminate the threat. Although equipped with less lethal options such as batons and OC spray, members may find that situational variables do not allow the use of such options to be either feasible or effective.

A 50.0% increase from the total number of ID-AA incidents in the prior year, 2024's three incidents is the first annual increase in this discharge category since 2021. Despite this, 2024 still equals 2022 as the second lowest annual total of ID-AAs since the creation of this report.

Among the three incidents in 2024, members discharged a total of nine rounds. One incident occurred when members responded as a dog aggressively attacked another dog then subsequently bit, and injured, a bystander who had attempted to intervene. As a result, one member discharged five rounds, striking the dog and causing its demise.

The second incident occurred when members arrived at a location as a dog was attacking its owner. In response, one member discharged two rounds, and another member discharged one round, the combined three rounds striking the dog and causing its demise. The dog's owner died as a result of the dog bite injuries suffered in the attack.

The third occurrence took place when one member discharged a single round at two dogs that had aggressively attacked, bit, and injured, that member. The round did not strike the involved dogs nor were there any reported injuries as a direct result of this discharge.

Two incidents occurred in the Bronx—both in the 42nd Precinct—and one in Queens, the first such occurrence in that borough since 2019. Two of the incidents took place during the first platoon and one occurred on the third platoon. All three incidents involved on-duty members of the service, four in total who discharged their firearms, each of whom were males, held the rank of police officer, and were assigned to patrol duty.

Though the number of discharging members in ID-AA incidents increased from two in 2023 to four in 2024, this still represents the second lowest number of discharging members in the history of this report, equaling the annual totals in 2022 and, prior to that, in 2018, respectively.

The four discharging members also falls below the annual average of approximately five discharging members in this category of incidents over the duration of this report. All four of the discharging members had between two and five years of service with the department.

The boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Staten Island did not experience an ID-AA in 2024. Manhattan has not had such an incident since 2017, and this also marked the first time since 2019 that an incident did not occur in the borough of Brooklyn. Over the last five years, the department has experienced 15 ID-AA incidents involving 17 discharging members of the service. The majority of these incidents took place during the third platoon and in almost half of all instances, just a single round was discharged by the involved member. As for the 17 discharging members over this time period, all were male, of which 76.5% were in the rank of police officer, and the majority, almost 53%, had between one and five years of service with the department.

Rounds Discharged per Member  
in ID-AA Incidents, 2024




Figure 25

Rounds Discharged per  
ID-AA Incidents, 2024




Figure 26

ID-AA Incidents by Platoon, 2024




Figure 27

ID-AA Incidents by Borough, 2024




Figure 28

## Unintentional Discharges

**T**here were 13 unintentional discharge incidents in 2024, marking only the third time in the history of this report that the annual total of this discharge category increased from the previous year. Representing an increase of 62.5% from the eight incidents that occurred in 2023, each of the incidents in 2024 involved a single member of the service unintentionally discharging a single round. While property damage was the outcome in the majority—11 of 13—incidents, two separate incidents resulted in injuries. In one incident, a member was shot and injured and in one other incident, a subject was shot and injured.

Eight unintentional discharge incidents occurred while the involved member was on-duty, up from four on-duty incidents in 2023. Three of these discharges occurred within a department facility, two transpired within a department vehicle, two took place in a commercial building, and the remaining incident occurred on a public street. The one subject that was shot and injured in 2024 occurred during an on-duty unintentional discharge.

Five unintentional discharges occurred while members were off-duty, up from four off-duty incidents that took place the year prior. Of these five discharges, four occurred within the residence of the respective discharging member and the remaining incident took place within the confines of a department facility. The one member of the service that was shot and injured in 2024 occurred as a result of an off-duty unintentional discharge.

Rank, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2024




Figure 29

In twelve incidents members discharged their own firearm, five of which were their service pistols, five were authorized off-duty pistols, one was a privately owned rifle, and one a privately owned shotgun. The remaining incident occurred when a member, while in possession of the service pistol of another member of the service, unintentionally discharged that firearm.

Eight members involved in unintentional discharges held the rank of police officer, three held the rank of detective, and two held the rank of sergeant.

The largest portion of discharging members, five, were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau. Of the remaining members, three were assigned to the Detective Bureau, two to the Housing Bureau, two to the Special Operations Division, and one member was assigned to the Transit Bureau.

Years of Service, Unintentional Discharge vs.  
Department Staffing, 2024




Figure 30

### **YEARS OF SERVICE**

For the first time since the inception of this report, members with five years of service or fewer did not account for the highest annual total of unintentional discharges. Instead, members with between six and ten years of service accounted for five unintentional discharges, the highest total in 2024 and also the largest annual sum recorded for that specific range of service time since this report began.

Two separate groupings, members with five years of service or less, as well as members with between 16 and 20 years, both recorded three unintentional discharge incidents in 2024. For the latter grouping, three unintentional discharges in one year marks the highest annual amount for that specific range of service time since the creation of this report. Of the remaining two discharges, both members had, at the time of their respective incidents, between 11 and 15 years of service with the department.

### **HANDLING**

Six unintentional discharge incidents, all of which transpired on-duty, were the result of a member failing to exercise due care in the handling of a firearm unrelated to the actions of loading/unloading or holstering.

Three of these six incidents were in direct relation to a member's performance of duty. Of these, two separate unintentional discharges occurred as the member was conducting a search—in one incident this was an office in a building and the other, the crawl space of a trailer. The third discharge that took place in direct relation to the performance of duty occurred on a public street as a member, while attempting to affect an arrest, struggled with a resisting subject.

Of the remaining three incidents, two occurred within departmental vehicles—one in which a member mishandled their duty pistol and the other when a member mishandled a firearm belonging to another member of the service. The remaining incident took place in a department facility when a member mishandled a firearm while attempting to clean it.

### **LOADING/UNLOADING**

Five unintentional discharges in 2024 were attributed to the actions of loading/unloading a firearm. Four incidents occurred while the discharging member was off duty and within their respective private residences. Of these four incidents, one firearm was a duty pistol, one was an authorized off-duty pistol, one was a rifle, and one was a shotgun.

The remaining incident occurred within a department facility and involved an on-duty member of the service with their authorized off-duty weapon.

### **HOLSTERING**

Two unintentional discharges occurred in relation to the act of holstering a firearm. In both instances, one on-duty and one off-duty, the discharge occurred as the member attempted to remove an article of clothing that had become lodged within the holster.

## Unauthorized Discharges

**I**n 2024, the department experienced nine firearms discharge incidents that were categorized as unauthorized discharges, a 12.5% increase from 2023 when eight total incidents were recorded. These nine incidents include five suicides by members of the service, a 66.7% increase from the three such incidents that occurred in the year prior and the first annual increase in member suicides by firearm since 2019. Conversely, the four non-suicide unauthorized discharges represent a 20.0% decrease from the five non-suicide discharge incidents that occurred in 2023, marking the first annual decrease in this category since 2020. Eight of the nine unauthorized discharge incidents that occurred in 2024 took place while the involved member was off-duty.

Of the four non-suicide incidents, three of the involved members held the rank of police officer and one held the rank of detective. Of these members—three males and one female—two were assigned to patrol duty within the Patrol Services Bureau, one member performed investigative functions within the Detective Bureau, and the remaining member worked in an administrative capacity within the department's Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Public Information. At the time of their respective incidents, three of the involved members had each accumulated less than five years of service while the remaining member had served with the department for 19 years.

In the first incident, on-duty members, responding to a 911 service call of a dispute involving an off-duty member, were informed that, during a previous dispute, the off-duty member had discharged a firearm into the ceiling of the residence. No injuries were reported as a result of the discharge and the member was suspended from duty. Though reported in 2024, this incident took place during the prior calendar year and while it is included in 2024's discharge totals within this report, due to data limitations it is not included in the TRI figures for calendar year 2024.

In the second incident, an off-duty member discharged a firearm during target practice on private property. Though no injuries were reported, the discharge caused minor property damage to an adjacent location. That member was arrested and suspended from duty.

The third incident occurred when an off-duty member discharged a firearm, striking and injuring a bystander. That member was arrested and suspended from duty.

The remaining unauthorized discharge occurred when on-duty members, after responding to a 911 service call of a dispute with a knife, were attempting to place the armed subject into custody. The subject resisted and a struggle ensued. During this struggle, the subject gained possession of the member's firearm from which one round was subsequently discharged. No injuries were reported as a result of the discharge and the subject was taken into custody.

## Uniformed Members of the Service Suicides by Firearm

**I**n 2024, five members of the service died by suicide by firearm, the first annual increase in this category of discharge since 2019 and just the third annual increase experienced in the history of this report. All five of the members in these incidents were males, two in the rank of police officer, two in the rank of detective, and one member who held the rank of sergeant. The length of their service with the department varied considerably. At the time of their respective incidents, one member had 19 years of service, one had 12 years, one member had 9 years, one member had 4 years, and the remaining member had 2 years of service with the department.

Each incident occurred while the member was off-duty, four of which took place within the residence of the respective member. The remaining incident occurred within the member's personal vehicle while it was parked on a public street. Four of the five incidents took place within the confines of New York City. Beyond the fatal injuries sustained by the involved member of the service, there were no reported injuries to bystanders.

Over the span of this report's existence, 38 members of the service have died by suicide by firearm. The highest annual total, nine members, occurred in 2019 and the five members in 2024 equals 2017 as the second highest annual total in the history of this report. The year 2024 also represents the fourth consecutive year that each of the involved members of this category of discharge were male.

Overall since 2016, 89.5% of the members that died by suicide by firearm were male and the remaining amount, 10.5% were female. While these percentages comparatively relate to the department's gender demographics, they also correlate to nationally reported suicide data by gender.

### UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2016-2024




Figure 31

When considering race and gender collectively, white males account for the largest percentage of members that died by suicide by firearm since the start of this report, statistically paralleling the department's demographical data. Similarly, police officers, who total the largest percentage of uniformed members in the department, also account for the highest percentage of members who have died by suicide by firearm historically. Of the members involved in these incidents since 2016, more than 34% had accumulated between six to ten years of service with the department, almost half were between the ages of 31 to 40, and the majority have been assigned to patrol-related duties.

## Health and Wellness

Within the duties of any member of the service are inherent stressors, both emotional and psychological, that are potentially fraught with varying aspects of trauma which may impact a member on a professional and personal level. Recognizing this, the department has placed the well-being and resiliency of its members at the forefront, as displayed by the introduction of an abundance of resources, both internal and external, available to members. Assistance and resolution resources available internally include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Interim and Critical Incident Support Service, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain's Unit, the NYPD Helpline, Peer Support, the Early Intervention Program, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. Among the external resources available are Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), Finest Care, the Police Self Support Group, and the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline.

Since 2019, the Health and Wellness Section (HWS) has been a formidable component of the department's commitment to enhancing health, morale and overall well-being, both professionally as well as on a personal level, of all members of the service. By offering a host of resources, many available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the HWS firmly supports and encourages positive physical and mental health of all members.

Overseen by HWS, the Employee Assistance Unit (EAU) serves as the critical peer support catalyst for the department by providing assistance with regard to a myriad of issues a member may face. Beyond responding to critical incidents, this unit, which features both uniformed and civilian members, remains a compassionate resource of support and even features three K-9 therapy dogs to assist in this task. Additional HWS offerings include Finest Care, a free and confidential counseling service provided in partnership with Northwell Direct and the Critical Incident Stress Management Program, implemented to assist members in the aftermath of critical, high stress, or traumatic incidents.

Members may also rely on the Peer Support Program for a more informal, yet confidential, form of support and guidance. Consisting of more than 400 volunteer peer representatives embedded in commands citywide, this program allows its members to maintain their regular duty assignments while providing co-workers with a support resource that is both local and familiar. This includes conveying information on physical and mental health, suicide prevention, and working to overcome any stigma that members may associate with the need to seek help.

In a further effort to address member well-being, the NYPD provides its members with a myriad of resource options. These remain accessible electronically through departmental desktops, on phone applications within departmental smart phones, and publicly on various social media pages, including several specifically dedicated to member wellness.

Moreover, as approaches to member well-being within the law enforcement community evolve, HWS strives to introduce enhancements and updates, as deemed necessary, to policy and training for the overall benefit of member wellness. Included in such enhancements is the NYPD's proactive virtual approach that offers webinars and virtual meetings on an assortment of wellness topics such as grief support, fitness, nutrition, finance, resiliency, and retirement planning.

In addition to the convenience of access, scheduling flexibility and a measure, if preferred, of privacy, these methods can offer members an immediate and substantial impact.

Recognizing the impact that member well-being bears on the mission of the NYPD, the department regularly evaluates the causative circumstances of issues that create a burden of stress on members, be it large or small. By gaining a better perspective and further insight on any such conditions and their influences, the department strives to emphasize the strength and accessibility of support services through the positive introduction and adaptation of existing resources and programs.



# CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS

**C**onducted electrical weapons (CEWs), often referred to as tasers or electronic control weapons/devices, are regularly utilized by law enforcement personnel as a less-lethal use of force option. Designed for temporary incapacitation, CEWs deliver an electrical charge to an individual that primarily affects their motor functions and/or the sensory nervous system. These less-lethal devices are intended to augment a member's force options during a confrontational situation and can be utilized to provide a greater margin of safety for both subjects and members of the service alike. Additionally, with the goal of voluntary compliance, CEWs allow for members to utilize laser warnings and warning arcs in an attempt to avoid the use of force and safely place an individual into custody. Under department policy, CEWs should only be used against persons who are actively resisting, exhibiting active aggression, or to prevent individuals from physically injuring themselves or other person(s) actually present. The use of a CEW is prohibited in situations that do not require the use of force.

When utilizing a CEW, members of the service may deploy the CEW in two separate modes: "cartridge" mode or "drive-stun" mode. Cartridge mode, also referred to as "probe deployment," is the primary mode of operation that utilizes compressed nitrogen gas to propel two probes from the CEW to a subject. A cartridge mode deployment qualifies as a Level 1 use of force incident under department policy. Drive-stun mode is when the front electrodes on the CEW are brought into direct contact with a subject's body. This deployment method is intended to be used as a supplementary method, rather than a primary method, absent exigent circumstances. A drive-stun mode deployment qualifies as a Level 2 use of force incident under department policy.

In an effort to minimize or eliminate the risk of weapons confusion, members of the service are instructed that CEWs are to be worn on the support side of the gun belt, opposite the member's firearm. Though a national standard for CEW use within law enforcement does not presently exist, NYPD policy remains largely consistent with the best practices recommended by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the Police Executive Research Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Institute of Justice.

The Department is currently undergoing a transition period for new CEWs, moving from Axon's X26 model to the Taser 7 model. The Taser 7 offers close encounter capabilities, improved probes for better connection, and provides enhanced integration to the Axon network for optimized workflows, inventory, and evidence management. Upon activation and deployment, the Taser 7 automatically activates body-worn cameras (BWCs) in a nearby proximity via Bluetooth. These benefits and capabilities will increase the effectiveness of CEWs and facilitate consistent and accurate documentation of occurrences as well as the preservation of evidence.

The X26 model and the Taser 7 model utilize replaceable cartridges that are equipped with two insulated, barbed probes designed to penetrate the skin. The two small probes are connected to copper clad steel within conductive wiring. The wires transmit short, controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses prevent coordinated muscular action within the peripheral nervous system, without affecting vital organs. After every deployment, CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident review.

A total of 29,885 uniformed members of the service were trained and authorized to use the CEWs that were deployed to personnel on a rotating deployment basis in 2024. As of the writing of this report, 17,626 uniformed members of the service, 59% of all CEW users, have been certified and authorized to utilize a Taser 7. Overall, the total number of trained and authorized members represent 88.1% of all current uniformed members of the service department-wide. Additionally, the total number of authorized members in 2024 represents a 172.2% increase from 2016, the inception of this report, when just 10,979 uniformed members of the service, approximately one-third of the entire department, were CEW-trained and authorized. The growth in the number of members trained in CEW usage can be attributed to the training of newly hired recruits and the natural attrition of uncertified personnel through retirement. Widespread distribution of CEWs

within the department did not begin until 2015; prior to that, authorization to carry and utilize CEWs was limited to Emergency Service Unit officers and supervisory personnel.

CEWs are only utilized by authorized uniformed members of the service and may be deployed for those members performing patrol duties. Currently, there are approximately 4,700 X26 CEWs and approximately 6,700 Taser 7 CEWs allotted to commands for use. These totals may fluctuate for various reasons that may include, but are not limited to, equipment being placed out of service due to damage, maintenance, and investigative purposes.

For the year 2024, there were 1,695 CEW discharge incidents, which involved 1,991 individual discharges. It should be noted that multiple CEW discharges might occur during a single incident. Additionally, a CEW use during a single use of force incident, may also be classified as a higher level of force, such as in a firearms discharge incident when a CEW was also utilized. In comparison to 2023, both CEW discharge incidents and individual discharges saw an increase in 2024. CEW discharge incidents saw a 13.3% increase, and individual CEW discharges a 12.3% increase respectively. Contributing factors that influenced these increases are a result of members responding to an additional 5.4% calls for service, along with members effecting 14.8% more arrests for the year.




Figure 32

The utilization of a CEW deployed in cartridge mode is both an effective and viable less lethal use of force option. The CEW serves as an additional tool for members of the service when confronted with a potentially dangerous situation and is an alternative means of use of force. Some benefits of a CEW deployment in cartridge mode include increased safety and distance for members of the service, an effective means of incapacitation, reduced injury risk to all parties involved, de-escalation potential, lower lethality risk, quick recovery times, and improved control in high-risk situations.

Of the CEW discharge incidents occurring in 2024, the highest percentage, 74% of all incidents, and 74.1% of all discharges, occurred during situations when members of the service encountered an individual during a crime in progress or when members were attempting to take an emotionally disturbed person (EDP) into custody. Crimes in progress incidents accounted for 902, or 53.2%, of 2024's CEW discharge incidents while another 353, or 20.8%, occurred as members were attempting to place an EDP into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in various types of situations that included, but were not limited to, the following: vehicle stops, past crime investigations, and apprehensions of wanted suspects.

## Responding to Persons in Crisis

**T**he primary duty of all members of the service is to preserve human life. The safety of all persons involved is paramount in cases involving emotionally disturbed persons. If such person is dangerous to themselves or others, force may be used when it is reasonable to prevent serious physical injury or death. Members of the service will use only the reasonable force necessary to gain control or custody of a subject. When there is time to negotiate, all the time necessary to ensure the safety of all individuals will be used.

An EDP, as defined by the Patrol Guide, is a person who appears to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and is conducting himself in a manner which a police officer reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to himself or others. Under New York State Mental Hygiene Law Section 9.41, police officers have the power to take any person into custody that appear to be mentally ill and is conducting themselves in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others present. Once the individual is transported to the hospital, the hospital does not advise the department of the outcomes of the individual's treatment due to privacy laws.

Uniformed members of the service below the rank of captain, including recruits assigned to the Police Academy, attend a four-day Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training module. This training includes lessons on effective communication techniques, department guidelines, and training scenarios focused on frequently encountered disorders. It also emphasizes utilizing proper communication techniques when interacting with people in crisis or displaying symptoms of mental illness. As of the end of calendar year 2024, there were 18,363 (54.6%) active CIT trained uniformed members of the service citywide.

Trained to recognize behavioral and situational cues, members utilize these indicators to form an appropriate approach to interact and respond to a person in crisis, including the use of all necessary time and de-escalation strategies. Despite the unique challenges these situations may present, members are trained to handle every EDP situation with patience and understanding. Members maintain the utmost professionalism while solely employing the reasonable amount of force necessary to achieve control or custody of a subject. Despite such efforts, these situations are unpredictable, and when a member's verbal directions fail or a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge may remain as one of the safer force options for both the subject and members of the service. For the calendar year 2024, the department responded to 162,961 calls for service involving EDPs, a 6.9% decrease in comparison to the year 2023. Of the 162,961 calls for service in 2024 that were classified as an EDP situation, 353 in total, a 2.8% decrease from 2023, included a CEW discharge incident. The vast majority of EDP-related calls for service in 2024 were, consistent with force data since this report began in 2016, handled and resolved by NYPD personnel without any need to utilize a CEW or force in any manner.

## CEW Deployment Modes

**A**s previously indicated, there are two separate modes in which a CEW can be deployed, "cartridge" mode and "drive-stun" mode. As per department policy, the primary mode of operation is cartridge mode, also known as, "probe deployment." Utilizing compressed nitrogen gas to propel two barbed probes from the CEW's cartridge, this mode allows members to obtain a zone of safety, providing separation from a subject while attempting to cause temporary neuromuscular incapacitation, thus immobilizing the subject.

In 2024's 1,695 CEW discharge incidents, 1,216 incidents, approximately 81.1%, were cartridge mode deployments. Since the inception of this report in 2016, the vast majority of CEW incidents have involved cartridge mode deployments. Comparing 2023 to 2024, the department saw a 9.5% increase in CEW cartridge mode incidents.

Drive-stun mode discharges, primarily intended as a supplementary option, accounted for 385 discharge incidents in 2024, approximately 13.9%, of all discharge incidents during the year. In this deployment mode, the front electrodes on the CEW are brought into direct contact with a subject's body, without a cartridge or after a cartridge has been discharged. A discharge of this type by itsWWAWelf does not achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment, as this mode does not generally cause neuromuscular incapacitation. As per department policy, a drive-stun deployment is intended

CEW Deployment Mode, 2024




Figure 33

to supplement the effectiveness of a close probe spread (three- or four-point contact), or to “complete the circuit” in the event of a single probe contact, or as a countermeasure to gain separation between officers and the subject so that officers can consider another force option. Despite being a smaller portion of the overall types of CEW deployments, the department saw a 22.2% increase in drive-stun mode deployments from 2023 to 2024.

Though less common among CEW discharge incidents, circumstances may develop in which a concerted use of both modes, cartridge and drive-stun, becomes necessary. As an example, during instances when just one probe penetrates a subject or when the distance between probes renders them insufficient, the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode is necessary to “complete the circuit” in order to achieve neuromuscular incapacitation. In 2024, 5.0% of all CEW discharge incidents occurred in which both cartridge and drive-stun modes were utilized. Since 2018, the overall percentage of deployments in which both modes were utilized, has remained comparatively similar, averaging nearly 5.0% annually. From 2023 to 2024, incidents requiring both deployment modes to be utilized increased by 34.3%.

## CEW Effectiveness


**E**very application of force by a member of the service occurs with a distinct, but sincere, goal: the safe, effective control of violent, actively resistant and/or aggressive subject(s) without a need to utilize any further manner of force. This goal encompasses all manners of force, CEW discharges included. NYPD Patrol Guide procedure 221-08, “Use of Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEW),” defines CEW effectiveness as: “Any immediate reaction, even if momentary, that causes a change in an actively aggressive subject’s or emotionally disturbed person’s physical actions and/or psychological behavior as the result of a pre-deployment verbal warning, activation, laser warning, warning arc, or discharge of a CEW.” It is important to emphasize that the majority of these actions —verbal warning, CEW activation (arming the CEW by releasing the safety), laser warning, and warning arc—are all actions that would likely occur prior to the actual discharge of a CEW.

The effectiveness of the CEW is significant in mitigating circumstances that may otherwise have escalated to deadly physical force. As a less lethal option, the CEW has proven to be a readily available tool that trained uniformed members of the service can rely upon to keep themselves and the public safe, and to have an alternative to the use of deadly physical force.

A comprehensive review of 2024’s force data reveals that of the 1,695 total CEW discharge incidents, 1,039 were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the subject. Additionally, 1,583 of all discharge incidents during this period were categorized as intentional. Of these intentional CEW discharge incidents, 65.6% were deemed effective, consistent with 2023’s results of 65.7%.

The reasons for ineffectiveness of an intentional CEW discharge are critical to understand when considering the sheer volume of calls for service in comparison to the number of CEW deployments. The three main reasons for ineffective CEW discharges include “probes fell out of subject,” “probes too far from surface area,” and “subject fought through pain.” A single ineffective discharge incident often has multiple, simultaneous causes. When analyzing these three specific reasons abstractly, it indicates several possibilities. “Probes fell out of subject” as an ineffective reason may be attributed to actively resisting and/or erratic behavior. “Probes too far from surface area” often occurs when the CEW’s probe(s) do not make proper contact with the subject due to clothing. Lastly, “subject fought through pain” often indicates the subject is possibly emotionally disturbed or under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.

Effectiveness of CEW Discharges, 2024



## Discharging Personnel

**S**ince 2017, personnel in the rank of police officer have accounted for the highest proportion of both individual discharges, as well as overall discharge incidents, annually. Unlike members performing investigative duties or members serving in higher supervisory ranks, members performing patrol-related functions are often the initial members on the scene of an incident that may result in a CEW discharge. The nature of a patrol assignment also elevates the probability for a member to encounter, and ultimately engage in, a hostile interaction with a subject.

CEW Discharges by Rank, 2024




Figure 35

Members in the rank of police officer were responsible for 80.7%—1,606 of 1,991—of all individual CEW discharges that occurred in 2024. Additionally, out of the 1,695 CEW discharge incidents in 2024, police officers accounted for 1,350 incidents, or 79.6%, as the discharging personnel. Frontline supervisors in the rank of sergeant and lieutenant were responsible for 15.5%—309 of 1,991—of all individual CEW discharges that occurred in 2024. Members in the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant accounted for 287 CEW discharge incidents, or 16.9%, as the discharging personnel.

## Time and Place of CEW Discharges

**F**ollowing the precedent in place since 2017, the majority of CEW discharge incidents in 2024, like the seven years prior, occurred on the third platoon, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. During these hours, 851 instances occurred, representing 50.2% of all discharge incidents for the year. The second platoon, 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., recorded the next highest total, 439 incidents, which represent approximately 25.9%, followed by 405 incidents on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m., representing 23.9% of all the year's total discharge incidents.

A higher total of CEW discharge incidents characteristically occurs in geographic boroughs that account for a higher amount of service calls, with Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Manhattan consistently among the top three boroughs in both CEW discharge incidents and the number of service calls annually.

The Bronx led the five boroughs in 2024's CEW discharge incidents, accounting for 30.5% of all discharge incidents, marking the seventh time since 2016 that this borough led the city in this category. Brooklyn came next with approximately 25.6% of the city's discharge incidents. Manhattan followed, accounting for 23.5%, Queens with 16.8%, and Staten Island was responsible for 3.6% of the annual CEW discharge incidents. Since 2016, Brooklyn has led the city twice in annual CEW discharge incidents, first in 2018 and again in 2022. In every remaining year over that same period, the Bronx accounted for the highest total of CEW discharges by borough annually.

During 2024, Brooklyn and Manhattan, as has been consistent since the inception of this report, led New York City as the respective top two boroughs with regard to 911 calls for service.

CEW Discharge Incidents by Platoon, 2024




Figure 36

CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2024




Figure 37

911 Calls for Service by Borough, 2024




Figure 38

# GENERAL USES OF FORCE

Every member of the New York City Police Department is held strictly accountable to demonstrate the proper use of force. New York State law allows the use of force by law enforcement members to effect an arrest, prevent escape, and to protect life and property. When a member of the service uses force, they must do so in compliance with both federal and state laws, and NYPD policy. In the effort to minimize the use of force, members strive for voluntary compliance. In instances where this is not feasible, members are to use the reasonable amount of force necessary to achieve compliance.

Historically, the use of force would be documented by members on various types of paperwork (such as Arrest Reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line-of-Duty Injury Reports) that lived in various places, lacking a centralized database. This posed a challenge to provide a comprehensive account of any specific incident. The department recognized this was problematic and in June of 2016, implemented the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report.

The TRI Report has streamlined both reporting and monitoring the use of force. Oversight has been improved by having one centralized database including the type(s) of force used, the demographic information of individuals subjected to force, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents. This data assists in identifying patterns and distinguishing deficiencies in training.

The TRI Report is the primary manner in which NYPD personnel document use of force incidents, whether force was used by, or against, a member of the service. The TRI Report continues to advance the department's goals towards enhanced accountability and transparency.

Threat, Resistance, or Injury Reports, 2024




Figure 39

\*This figure does not include three separate discharge incidents, all categorized as unauthorized discharges, in which a member discharged their firearm. Though not captured within this TRI data, all three incidents are included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharges section of this report.

In 2024, 14,006 TRI Reports were prepared, documenting 11,746 reportable use of force incidents. Among these completed TRI Reports, 2,260 were for incidents that, although reportable under the department's force policy, did not involve the use of force by a member of the service. As an example, should a subject in department custody be assaulted by another subject also in custody, a TRI Report would be prepared though not be categorized as a use of force incident. Likewise, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, though it is not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, incidents in which a subject assaults a member of the service, without any force utilized by NYPD personnel, also generates a TRI Report. While incidents such as these do not involve any application of force by a member of the service, they do, however, activate an exhaustive oversight mechanism governed by the department's force investigation policy.

Under the department's four level force classification rubric, 95.3% of force incidents in 2024 consisted of a Level 1 use of force, 3.0 % Level 2 use of force, 1.3% Level 3 use of force, and 0.4% Level 4 use of force.

By comparison, in 2023 11,939 TRI Reports were prepared, documenting 9,777 reportable use of force incidents. The force incidents in 2023 consisted of 95.2% Level 1 use of force, 3% Level 2 use of force, 1.5% Level 3 use of force, and 0.3% Level 4 use of force. Within the history of this report, 2020 was the first full year to utilize the four-level force classification rubric. Prior to that, department policy was comprised of just three levels of force classification. The revision of the TRI Report, as well as department policy, that occurred in October of 2019 created a more intuitive reporting process and included the bifurcation of the Level 3 category by creating the Level 4 category. This revision established the framework from which current policy continues to evolve.

Force Reporting Levels, 2024




Figure 40

Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2024




Figure 41

Though this or any such revision in department policy may impact the historical comparison of force level data, since the creation of this report in 2016, the overwhelming majority of force incidents involved just the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service.

Similarly, the majority of 2024's 11,746 force incidents involved just the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service. Physical force, consisting of actions that include forcible takedowns, hand strikes, and foot strikes, amounted to 9,793 incidents, a total that represents approximately 83.4% of all force incidents for that period. Representing the next highest percentage of force utilized, CEWs accounted for approximately 14.4% of force incidents, of which 93.4% were intentional discharge incidents.

The remaining force incidents by equipment or force option included: 134 uses of OC spray (1.14%), 73 uses of impact weapons (0.62%), 50 firearms discharges (0.43%) and one police canine bite (approximately 0.01%). There were no reported uses of mesh restraining blankets in 2024.

Reversing the trend of the previous two years, the department experienced a decrease in the cumulative amount of four specific less-lethal force incidents: impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, and police canine bites. Combined, these four incident categories amounted to 208 of all force incidents in 2024, approximately a 9.4% decrease from 2023's 230 incidents of comparable force. The overall decrease came from the lessening of OC spray incidents which, in 2024, totaled 134 incidents, 27 less than in 2023. While there was no change in the number of either mesh restraining blanket or police canine bite incidents, there was a minimal increase, 7.4%, in the use of impact weapons which totaled 73 as compared to 68 during the prior year. When combining CEW incidents, which increased for the fourth consecutive year, with the four aforementioned force options, less-lethal force incidents overall increased by 10.3% when compared to the previous year, fueled by the 13.4% and 7.4% increases in CEW and impact weapon incidents, respectively.

The majority, approximately 64.9%, or 7,623 of 2024's total of 11,746 force incidents occurred during four arrest-related categories: crimes in progress, prisoner interactions, past crime/violation investigations, and wanted suspect investigations. When combined with 2024's force incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons, these five incident types account for approximately 79% of all NYPD uses of force. In 2024, force was utilized in approximately 3.5% of total arrests (9,241 of 260,503) effected by members of the service. Though a slight increase, percentage-wise, from the prior year, 2024 experienced a 14.8% increase in the total number of arrests as compared to 2023's total. Of 2024's remaining force incidents, the most significant categories involving the use of force included vehicular summons enforcement (VTL infractions) at approximately 6.4% of incidents, crowd control at approximately 3.6% of incidents, and suspicious activity at approximately 1.8% of the total use of force occurrences during 2024.

Force Used During Arrests by Subject Race, 2024




Figure 42

Total Arrests by Subject Race, 2024




Figure 43

The race and ethnicity of the members of the service that utilized force in 2024 largely correlates with the racial and ethnic breakdown of the overall uniformed staffing of the department. Of the subjects of police force in 2024, the race and ethnicity of these subjects generally corresponds to the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by overall arrests, subjects who resist arrest, and information provided from crime victims that includes the description of assault suspects, robbery suspects, and shooting suspects.

## Uniformed Members Using Force, 2024




Figure 44

## Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2024




Figure 45

As has been a constant during the history of this report, the highest percentage of individuals subjected to police force were those between the ages of 16 and 35, accounting for nearly two-thirds of all individuals subjected to force on an annual basis. This trend continued in 2024, as this age group accounted for approximately 61.6% of all individuals that were the subject of force. Viewed further, of all individuals subjected to force between the ages of 16 and 25, 50.5% were Black, 35.0% were Hispanic, 4.1% were White, and the remaining 10.4% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the subjects between the ages of 26 and 35, 52.5% were Black, 30.3% were Hispanic, 6.8% were White, and the remaining 10.4% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the individuals subjected to force between the ages of 36 and 59, 51.4% were Black, 26.6% were Hispanic, 12.0% were White, and the remaining 10.0% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of subjects ages 60 and older, 47.9% were Black, 20.8% were Hispanic, 17.6% were White, and the remainder, 13.7%, were Asian or other ethnicities.

Geographically, the highest percentage of reported force in 2024 occurred in Brooklyn, accounting for 26.9% of all reported use of force citywide. Manhattan and the Bronx followed closely with 25.9% and 25.7%, respectively, of the annual total. Queens and Staten Island, accounted for 17.8% and 3.7%, respectively, and even when combined, these two fall significantly below any one of the other three boroughs. Citywide, 2024's use of force incidents occurred most often on the

Subjects of Force by Age/Race, 2024




Figure 46

Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2024




Figure 47

Force Reporting by Platoon, 2024




Figure 48

third platoon, 52.0%, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., followed by 25.6% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and 22.4% occurring on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. Use of force by borough and platoon has remained overwhelmingly consistent since this report began in 2016. During this time, Brooklyn has continuously reported the highest percentage of force by borough annually followed on six occasions by Manhattan, which ranked second in 2024. Additionally, Staten Island and Queens have accounted for the lowest and the second lowest reported force by borough, respectively, over that time. Furthermore, during all but one year since the creation of this report, the highest percentage of force reported by platoon occurred on the third platoon followed by the second platoon, which recorded the second highest percentage in 2024 as it has consistently done during the previous six years.




Figure 49




Figure 50

## Civilian Force Complaints

**F**or the second consecutive year, force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) experienced an annual increase, rising approximately 6.8% in 2024 as compared to the total number of force complaints in 2023. While the 2,764 force complaints received by CCRB in 2024 represents the highest total on record during the history of this report, the substantiated cases are approximately 7.0%.

It should be noted that the disposition of a complaint may, due to the investigative process, occur at a timeframe distinctive from when the complaint was reported, meaning a disposition in any given year may be for a complaint reported in a previous year.

Each day and on every tour, members of the service regularly interact with victims, witnesses, suspects, bystanders, and civilian members of the community. These public interactions and encounters, whether amid the public's request for assistance through the millions of 911 or 311 calls for service, while conducting enforcement or investigations, or simply during a member's daily activities, most often occur without any police use of force or any complaint of unnecessary force. During 2024, as members of the service responded to more than 6.9 million 911 calls for service, just a fraction of such calls and interactions resulted in force complaints against a uniformed member of the service. During 2024, the ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases is approximately 2,522 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated force allegations is approximately 35,753 to 1. The ratio of force incidents to substantiated force allegations is approximately 60 to 1.

CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2016-2024




Figure 51

## Force Used Against Members of the Service

**E**very day, members of the service go about their duties with the understanding that at any given time any event, encounter, or interaction may result in violence. The goal of every member of the service, in any given scenario, is to attain voluntary compliance, however, despite all efforts put forth by a member of the service, that is not always realistic. Due to their very nature, these encounters often maintain a potential for contention and hostility, which may ultimately induce violence and potentially result in injuries to subjects, members of the service, or both.

In 2024, the NYPD recorded 11,730 incidents during which subjects used force against members of the service. Although incidents of force against members often occur during instances in which members themselves utilize force, for analytical purposes, force used by members and force used against members are viewed independently of one another.

Of all incidents in which force was used against NYPD personnel, the majority, more than 64.9%, occurred during four categories of arrest-related circumstances: crime/violation in progress, prisoner interactions, past crime investigations, and wanted suspect investigations. Beyond these situations, 14.2% of 2024's incidents in which force was used against a member occurred during encounters with emotionally disturbed persons. Since this report's inception, arrest-related situations along with EDP encounters have consistently ranked among the highest percentages of incident types resulting in force used against a member of the service. VTL infractions (approximately 6.3%), crowd control (3.6%), and suspicious activity (approximately 1.7%) are among the other categories that represented significant percentages of force against members in 2024. Similar to the year-end totals since this report began, the most prevalent type of force used against members of the service was physical force without weapons, which in 2024 represented over 98.4% of force against members. The remaining 1.6% of incidents included either the use or display of a weapon by a subject.

Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2024




Figure 52

As has occurred in eight of the last nine years, Brooklyn led the city in 2024 as the geographical borough responsible for the highest percentage of force incidents against members of the service, accounting for 26.9% of these incident types. Manhattan and the Bronx followed closely with 25.9% and 25.7%, respectively. The remaining percentage of incidents in which force was used against members of the service occurred in Queens (17.8%) and Staten Island (3.7%). The third platoon, 3:31 p.m to 11:30 p.m, has been the time frame where the most force used against members has occurred. In 2024, 52.1% of all incidents where force was used against members occurred on the third platoon. The second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., followed next accounting for 25.6% of instances and the remaining 22.3% occurred on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m to 7:30 a.m. As previously stated, data regarding force incidents against members of the service is consistent with that of the use of force by members of the service.



In 2024, there were 15,190 subjects of police force, of which 14,750 (approximately 97.1%) sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 440 subjects sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. During the 11,730 incidents in which force was used against members of the service, 5,839 members of the department sustained injuries, 416 of which were deemed substantial or serious. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.




Figure 53

Force Used Against Members  
by Platoon, 2024




Figure 54

CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2024




Figure 55

Use of Force Related Injuries,  
Subjects vs. Members, 2024




Figure 56

# **FORCE APPENDICES**

# **APPENDIX A**

## NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process

In all use of force incidents, an immediate supervisor responds to the scene to assess the circumstances. The supervisor must determine the level of force and/or type of injury in order to clarify the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements. All reportable uses of force by members of the service are investigated, including those determined to be within department guidelines.

### **LEVEL 1**

**Use of:** hand strikes; foot strikes; forcible take downs; wrestling/grappling; O.C. spray; mesh restraining blanket; CEW (cartridge mode)

or

A physical injury to a non-member of the service resulting from police action (unless consistent with use of higher level of force)

### **LEVEL 2**

**Use of:** any object as an impact weapon; police canine bite; CEW (drive stun mode); any prohibited act (excluding the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold, or prohibited method of restraint, or those that result in a serious physical injury, or those related to a firearm discharge)

or

Alleged/suspected excessive force (no injury/physical injury); attempted prisoner suicide (excluding serious physical injury)

or

A physical injury to a non-member of the service consistent with use of Level 2 force;

The MEMBER OF THE SERVICE completes the Threat, Resistance, or Injury (TRI) ***Interaction Report***.

The IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR conducts the investigation, completes the TRI ***Incident Report***, and closes the incident unless any

All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by the members' IMMEDIATE

The MEMBER OF THE SERVICE completes the TRI ***Interaction Report***.

The DUTY CAPTAIN conducts the investigation and completes the TRI ***Incident Report***.

The INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU (IAB)

All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by the members' COMMANDING

Figure 57

\*FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.

### **LEVEL 3**

**Use of:** force readily capable of causing death or serious injury, except firearm discharges.

or

Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint.

or

Alleged/suspected excessive force (serious physical injury); attempted prisoner suicide (serious physical injury)

or

Serious physical injury to a non-member of the service.

### **LEVEL 4**

All police firearms discharges

or

Any discharge of a member of the service's firearm fired by someone other than the member.

or

A non-member of the service dies or is seriously injured and likely to die.

The MEMBER OF THE SERVICE completes the TRI **Interaction** Report unless superseded by the investigative authority of the FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISON (FID).

IAB conducts the investigation and completes the TRI **Incident** Report.

FID conducts the investigation and completes the TRI **Interaction** Report and the TRI **Incident** Report.

All reports generate an IAB case. Follow-up investigations are reviewed by IAB investigators, supervisors, and executives before being closed.

The NYPD's USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD reviews all cases for which a member of FID is the investigating supervisor. Additionally, any violations of force prohibitions at any level may be reviewed on a per-case basis to determine

Figure 57

## APPENDIX B

### Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge- Adversarial Conflict Incidents

#### **Disclaimer:**

In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

#### **INCIDENT 1 – 101ST PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/26) – 02/12/2024**



On February 12th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of shots fired. Upon arrival, the officers were informed by an individual that they had been menaced with a firearm by the subject. The officers attempted to engage with the subject who, after a brief conversation, retreated into a bedroom and pointed a firearm at the officers. In response, an officer discharged their service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. An imitation pistol was recovered at the scene.

#### **INCIDENT 2 – 112TH PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/46) – 03/08/2024**



On March 8th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person stabbing others with a knife. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject in the hallway brandishing a knife. The subject ignored the officers' verbal commands to drop the knife and advanced towards the officers while brandishing the knife. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene.

#### **INCIDENT 3 – 67TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/20) – 03/18/2024**



On March 18th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of shots fired. While conducting a canvass in regards, the officers observed the subject running in the street and then discharge a firearm in the direction of several individuals. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Taurus PT111 G2A 9mm handgun was recovered at the scene.

#### **INCIDENT 4 – 102ND PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/19) – 03/27/2024**



On March 27th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, the officers were led inside by an individual on scene when they encountered the subject and another individual. Upon sight of the officers, the subject removed a pair of scissors from a drawer and advanced toward the officers who, in response, deployed their conducted electrical weapons. At this time, the other individual removed the scissors from the subject's possession, and an officer again deployed a conducted electrical weapon. The subject regained possession of the scissors and again advanced at the officers. In response, one officer discharged their weapon at the subject. The subject then struggled with the other individuals on scene and again advanced at the officers while brandishing scissors. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A pair of scissors was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC, THC-COOH, and Delta-9 Carboxy THC in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### **INCIDENT 5 – 115TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/65) – 04/20/2024**



On April 20th, 2024, officers assigned to foot patrol observed the subject menace two victims while brandishing a knife. The officers issued verbal commands to the subject to drop the knife and one officer deployed a conducted electrical weapon, which was ineffective. The subject then advanced towards one officer and civilian bystanders. In response, one officer discharged their service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene.

#### **INCIDENT 6 – 10TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/25) – 04/30/2024**




On April 30th, 2024, officers were conducting an investigation when they observed the subject, who was known to be wanted for an unrelated crime. The officers confronted the subject and attempted to place him into custody when the subject resisted, and a physical altercation ensued. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Bersa Thunder 40 Pro .40 caliber handgun was recovered at the scene.

#### **INCIDENT 7 – 67TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/33) – 05/12/2024**



On May 12th, 2024, officers assigned to patrol observed the subject engaged in a verbal dispute. Upon sight of the officers, who had exited their vehicle to investigate the dispute, the subject began to flee while brandishing a firearm. One officer deployed a conducted electrical weapon, which was ineffective. The subject maintained possession of the firearm and again attempted to flee. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Taurus G2C 9mm handgun was recovered at the scene.

#### **INCIDENT 8 – 83RD PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/26) – 05/26/2024**




On May 26th, 2024, officers were parked and sitting in a marked police vehicle when the subject approached and threw a glass bottle, striking and damaging the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, the officers encountered the subject who brandished a knife and advanced toward one officer. Both officers deployed conducted electrical weapons causing the subject to fall to the ground. The subject then got up and, while still brandishing a knife, ignored verbal commands and continued to advance toward the officers. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Two knives were recovered at the scene.



#### **INCIDENT 9 – EDISON, NEW JERSEY (MALE/BLACK/46) – 06/13/2024**

On June 12th, 2024, while beyond the confines of New York City, officers were conducting surveillance regarding an attempted homicide investigation when they encountered the subject, who was the focus of the active investigation. Upon encountering the officers, the subject discharged a firearm in their direction, striking an officer. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject, who was pronounced deceased on scene. A Heckler & Koch Model S&W .40 caliber handgun was recovered at the scene.



#### **INCIDENT 10 – 103RD PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/20) – 07/04/2024**

On July 4th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an assault with a knife. Upon arrival, officers were informed that an individual, who appeared to be suffering a stab wound, had left the location. Officers were then directed to an apartment at the location where there might be additional victims. Upon arrival at the apartment, officers observed the subject, armed with a knife, in a physical struggle with another individual. The subject refused the officer's verbal commands to drop the knife, and in response, an officer discharged their service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Three civilian victims sustained stab wounds from the subject, one of whom was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene.

**INCIDENT 11 – 23RD PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/62) – 08/25/2024**



On August 25th, 2024, officers responded to multiple 911 calls of a male with a firearm. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the subject who attempted to flee while ignoring verbal commands to drop the gun. The subject continued in the direction of one of the officers while in possession of a firearm when, in response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Polymer 80 PF940C 9mm handgun was recovered at the scene.

**INCIDENT 12 – 70TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/38) – 09/13/2024**



On September 13th, 2024, officers were conducting an investigation in connection with a homicide of which the subject was the focus. During their search, officers encountered the subject who was in possession of a knife. The subject ignored the officer's verbal commands to drop the knife and advanced at the officers. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene.

**INCIDENT 13 – 103RD PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/57) – 11/19/2024**



On November 19th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of a robbery in progress. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject who briefly fled on foot. As the officers approached, the subject discharged a firearm at the officers, striking one officer. In response, an officer discharged their service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A .357 Magnum Colt Python revolver was recovered at the scene.

**INCIDENT 14 – 77TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/21) – 12/05/2024**



On December 5th, 2024, officers responded to a ShotSpotter activation when a bystander provided them with a description of the vehicle believed to be responsible for the firearm discharge. The officers performed a canvas, at which time they encountered the vehicle, and a pursuit ensued. The subject vehicle struck another vehicle and became disabled when the subject emerged from the passenger side of the vehicle while brandishing a firearm and pointed it towards the officers. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject and the vehicle's operator. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Ruger P95DC 9mm handgun was recovered at the scene.

## **APPENDIX C**

Other Death Investigations Conducted by  
Force Investigation Division

## Death in Custody

**D**death in custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term “in-custody” refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. During death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police facility, or in a courthouse awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises such as heart attack or stroke; suicides; drug-related deaths from substances taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted prior to custody during accidents or assaults by persons other than the involved parties. In 2024, there were 25 death in custody incidents.

### **INCIDENT 1 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 42ND PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/54) – 01/11/2024**

On January 9th, 2024, officers responded to a request, via 911, by another agency to assist in the eviction of an occupant. Upon arrival, officers could not gain access to the apartment due to obstructions from within. Prior to officers gaining access into the location, the subject exited a window and fell approximately three stories to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on January 11th, 2024. The subject’s death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

### **INCIDENT 2 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 1ST PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/25) – 02/09/2024**

On February 9th, 2024, while awaiting arraignment and lodged within the Manhattan Central Booking facility, the subject suffered a medical episode and had a seizure. Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) responded and removed the subject to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was probable cardiac arrhythmia with myocardial hypertrophy.

### **INCIDENT 3 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 48TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/35) – 02/16/2024**

On February 16th, 2024, the subject was removed to the hospital due to injuries sustained in a scooter collision. Officers placed the subject into custody due to results of a prior unrelated investigation. Subsequently, the subject’s condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the torso.

### **INCIDENT 4 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 1ST PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/25) – 03/12/2024**

On March 8th, 2024, while awaiting arraignment inside Manhattan Central Booking, the subject was found unresponsive. Officers administered aid to the subject until the arrival of EMS, who removed him to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on March 12th, 2024. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was complications of anoxic ischemic encephalopathy due to acute intoxication by the combined effects of fentanyl, xylazine, morphine, and oxycodone.

### **INCIDENT 5 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 110TH PRECINCT (MALE/ASIAN/48) – 03/25/2024**

On March 25th, 2024, while undergoing arraignment inside the Queens Central Booking facility, the subject was removed to the hospital due to high blood pressure. At the hospital, the subject experienced a medical episode and was pronounced deceased. The subject’s death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

### **INCIDENT 6 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 49TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/49) – 04/16/2024**

On April 16th, 2024, the subject was placed into custody as the result of a vehicle collision while attempting to flee from officers. The subject suffered a medical episode and officers on scene administered aid before removing him to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact to the torso.

**INCIDENT 7 – MEDICAL/POLICE FORCE USED – 33RD PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/18) – 06/09/2024**

On June 9th, 2024, a vehicle operated by the subject fled an attempted stop at a high rate of speed. After a collision that impacted the vehicle's mobility, the subject fled on foot and an officer deployed a conducted electrical weapon that missed the subject. The subject continued to flee, climbed over a guardrail on the George Washington Bridge and hung off the bridge. Attempts by the subject and the officer to pull the subject back up failed and the subject fell from the elevated position approximately 65 feet to the ground below. Officers and EMTs administered aid to the subject who was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head and torso.

**INCIDENT 8 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 44TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/51) – 06/11/2024**

On May 29th, 2024, while awaiting arraignment within the Bronx Central Booking Facility, the subject suffered a medical episode, showing symptoms of narcotic withdrawal. The subject was removed to the hospital where he went into cardiac arrest. While admitted, the subject suffered a second cardiac arrest on June 4th, 2024, and was subsequently pronounced deceased on June 11th, 2024, after being taken off life support. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple complications of acute and chronic substance use.

**INCIDENT 9 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 18TH PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/50) – 06/11/2024**

On May 31st, 2024, while admitted as a patient in a hospital, the subject was placed in custody on an unrelated warrant. The subject's medical condition deteriorated, and he was subsequently pronounced deceased on June 11th, 2024. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications due to infection of the heart in conjunction with chronic drug use.

**INCIDENT 10 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 84TH PRECINCT (FEMALE/BLACK/36) – 06/26/2024**

On June 26th, 2024, while lodged within the Brooklyn Central Booking facility awaiting arraignment, the subject suffered a medical episode and struck her head on the ground. On-site medical staff and officers administered aid to the unresponsive subject who was ultimately pronounced deceased on the scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication by the combined effects of fentanyl and methamphetamine.

**INCIDENT 11 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 1ST PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/49) – 06/30/2024**

On June 29th, 2024, while lodged within the Manhattan Central Booking facility awaiting arraignment, the subject became unresponsive and suffered a medical episode. Officers began life-saving measures until the subject was removed to the hospital. At the hospital, the subject's condition deteriorated, and he was subsequently pronounced deceased on June 30, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 12 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 114TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/15) – 07/02/2024**

On July 1st, 2024, the subject was operating an unregistered motorized scooter and fled from officers at a high rate of speed when the scooter collided with a bus. Officers on scene administered aid until the arrival of EMTs who removed the subject to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on July 2nd, 2024. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head.

**INCIDENT 13 – MEDICAL/POLICE FORCE USED – 104TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/33) – 08/03/2024**

On August 3rd, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject, and a physical altercation ensued while attempting to restrain the subject. Officers deployed a CEW in cartridge mode, striking the subject, before placing him into custody. The subject was removed to the hospital where his condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 14 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 107TH PRECINCT (MALE/ASIAN/30) – 08/06/2024**

On August 6th, 2024, officers arrested the subject and, upon arrival at the precinct, observed injuries to the subject from an unrelated vehicle accident. The subject was removed to the hospital, where his condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute methamphetamine intoxication.

**INCIDENT 15 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 120TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/55) – 08/22/2024**

On August 15th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an assault with a knife. Upon arrival, they encountered the subject lying on the ground holding a knife. Officers placed the subject into custody and requested the response of EMS. Upon removal to the hospital, the subject was observed with a laceration to his head that was sustained prior to police contact. While receiving treatment at the hospital, it was discovered that the subject had a catastrophic brain injury and was pronounced deceased on August 22nd, 2024. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of blunt impact injuries of the head.

**INCIDENT 16 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 40TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/44) – 08/23/2024**

On August 23rd, 2024, while lodged within the precinct holding cell awaiting removal to the hospital, the subject was found unconscious. Officers and responding EMS administered aid on scene until removing the subject to the hospital where his condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 17 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 110TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/31) – 09/07/2024**

On September 6th, 2024, officers responding to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. After officers placed the subject into custody, a family member informed officers that the subject had ingested narcotics. He was transported to the hospital, where he lost consciousness, and his condition deteriorated. The subject was pronounced deceased on September 7th, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 18 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 123RD PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/35) – 10/13/2024**

On October 11th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 of an unconscious male in a vehicle. Upon arrival, the officers were met by FDNY personnel who advised that the subject was removed to the hospital by EMS. While securing the subject's vehicle, officers observed controlled substances in plain view and subsequently placed the subject into custody at the hospital. The subject's condition deteriorated, and he was subsequently placed on life support and ultimately pronounced deceased on October 13th, 2024. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication due to combined effects of fentanyl and other controlled substances.

**INCIDENT 19 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 33RD PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/52) – 10/25/2024**

On September 17th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers encountered and restrained the subject then requested the response of EMS. While awaiting EMS to respond, the subject became unconscious and unresponsive, prompting the officers to remove the subject directly to the hospital. At the hospital, the subject's condition deteriorated, he was placed on life support and later pronounced deceased on October 25th, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

**INCIDENT 20 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 120TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/35) – 11/07/2024**

On November 6th, 2024, officers responded to multiple 911 calls of a male stabbed. Upon the officers arrival on scene, EMS had removed the subject to the hospital. The subject was subsequently placed under arrest for a prior, unrelated incident. The subject's condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased on November 7th, 2024. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was stab wound of the abdomen with penetration of major blood vessels.

**INCIDENT 21 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 107TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/40) – 11/14/2024**

On November 12th, 2024, while lodged within the Queens Central Booking facility, the subject felt ill and was removed to the hospital. The subject, against the advice of his attending physician, refused any further medical attention, was discharged, and transported back to the Queens Central Booking facility where he suffered a medical episode. Officers requested EMS and began administering aid. The subject was removed to the hospital and was subsequently pronounced deceased on November 14th, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 22 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 78TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/47) – 11/16/2024**

On November 7th, 2024, while lodged inside the Brooklyn Central Booking facility awaiting arraignment, the subject was found unresponsive, suffering from an apparent seizure. Medical staff and officers began life-saving measures until EMS removed the subject to the hospital. The subject's condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased on November 16th, 2024. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was from atherosclerosis and cardiovascular disease complicated by acute cocaine intoxication.

**INCIDENT 23 – MEDICAL/POLICE FORCE USED – 49TH PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/35) – 11/18/2024**

On November 16th, 2024, while lodged within the precinct holding cell awaiting the arrival of EMS, the subject complained of narcotic withdrawals and became combative. The subject was removed to the hospital and admitted for further evaluation. The subject subsequently suffered a medical episode and was pronounced deceased on November 18th, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 24 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 67TH PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/63) – 12/07/2024**

On December 6th, 2024, while lodged within the precinct holding cell awaiting arrest processing, CCTV video showed the subject fall to the ground and suffer from an apparent seizure. EMS responded but the conscious subject refused medical assistance. A short time later, the subject appeared to suffer another seizure. Officers attempted life-saving measures prior to the arrival of EMTs who removed the subject to the hospital, where the subject's condition deteriorated, and he was pronounced deceased on December 7th, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 25 – MEDICAL/NO POLICE FORCE USED – 72ND PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/63) – 12/12/2024**

On December 11th, 2024, the subject was transported from the precinct holding cell to the hospital for treatment of symptoms of narcotics withdrawal. While at the hospital, the subject experienced a cardiac episode and was pronounced deceased on December 12th, 2024. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

## Death Preceding Custody

**D**death preceding custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. In 2024, the Force Investigation Division investigated 9 cases categorized as death preceding custody.

### **INCIDENT 1 – SUBJECT DECEASED – 72ND PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/47) – 01/25/2024**

On January 25th, 2024, officers were conducting routine patrol aboard the Staten Island ferry when approached about a disruptive passenger. Upon arrival to the subject's location, the officers recognized the intoxicated subject as a frequent patron and attempted to establish a dialogue. The subject backed away from the officers, leaned over a railing on the ferry and fell approximately twenty feet overboard into the water while the ferry was still in motion. Attempts were made by the officers to prevent the subject from falling but were unsuccessful as the officers never made physical contact with the subject. The unconscious subject was removed from the water by the Harbor Unit who immediately began life saving measures during transport to the hospital by EMS, where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications due to drowning and hypothermia.

### **INCIDENT 2 – SUICIDE – 108TH PRECINCT (MALE/ASIAN/45) – 07/09/2024**

On July 9th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person on a rooftop. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the subject kneeling on the building ledge. The officers unsuccessfully attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject. Within moments, the subject leapt from the roof ledge falling to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma.

### **INCIDENT 3 – SUICIDE – 49TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/40) – 07/20/2024**

On July 20th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person hallucinating and acting violently while armed with a firearm. Upon arrival, the officers attempted to establish a dialogue when they observed the subject place the firearm to his head. The officers immediately exited the apartment and awaited the response of additional units. A dialogue was established for a brief period before the subject discharged the firearm, striking himself. The subject was pronounced deceased on scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was intraoral gunshot wound with brain injuries.

### **INCIDENT 4 – FLEEING SUSPECT – 40TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/21) – 08/10/2024**

On August 10th, 2024, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction when the subject, operating a motorized dirt bike, fled at a high rate of speed. As the subject fled, he collided with an SUV. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and neck.

### **INCIDENT 5 – DROWNING – 1ST PRECINCT (FEMALE/WHITE/49) – 08/29/2024**

On August 29th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of a water rescue. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the subject floating in the water but lost sight of the subject who was subsequently removed from the water by FDNY personnel assisting in the search. The subject was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was drowning.

### **INCIDENT 6 – FLEEING SUSPECT – 105TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/64) – 08/30/2024**

On August 30th, 2024, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a wanted vehicle. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed and the officers observed the subject vehicle collide with another vehicle. Upon extraction, the subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma.

**INCIDENT 7 – FLEEING SUSPECT – 42ND PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/24, MALE/BLACK/32) – 10/12/2024**

On October 12th, 2024, officers attempted to stop the subject vehicle for a traffic infraction when the vehicle fled at a high rate of speed. As the vehicle continued to flee, it collided with another vehicle. Two subjects within the subject vehicle were removed to the hospital where they were pronounced deceased. Both subjects' death certificates were not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 8 – FLEEING SUSPECT – 49TH PRECINCT (MALE/WHITE/51) – 11/09/2024**

On November 9th, 2024, officers conducted a car stop on a suspect vehicle regarding a homicide in a neighboring county. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officers were approaching on foot when a gunshot was heard from within the vehicle and the subject was found with a self-inflicted gun-shot wound. The subject was extracted from the vehicle and removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

**INCIDENT 9 – SUICIDE – 50TH PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/41) – 12/05/2024**

On December 5th, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call of a family dispute in progress. Upon arrival, the officers heard multiple gunshots emanate from the location and encountered the victim with multiple gunshots wounds to the torso. Further investigation revealed the subject had sustained a self-inflicted gunshot wound and he was subsequently pronounced deceased at the hospital. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of the report.

## Death No Custody Contemplated

**D**earth no custody contemplated occurs when a person becomes deceased during a police interaction, and that person was not taken into police custody, nor did the police contemplate taking them into custody. In 2024, the Force Investigation Division investigated 8 cases categorized as death no custody contemplated. Seven of these cases occurred during the calendar year 2024. The remaining case, an incident that occurred in 2022 and resulted in the death of a pedestrian in May of 2023, was not included in this, or any previous, year's data.

### **INCIDENT 1 – COLLISION – 104TH PRECINCT (FEMALE/HISPANIC/29) – 02/22/2024**

On February 22nd, 2024, officers responded to multiple 911 calls for a suspicious male banging on doors. Upon arrival, officers encountered the suspicious male who was standing beside a damaged, parked vehicle with an injured individual in the passenger seat. Once extracted, the individual was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the individual's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and bleeding of the brain. An investigation determined the individual was a passenger in a vehicle that fled an earlier car stop in an adjoining precinct. Subsequent to fleeing the stop, that vehicle was involved in a high-speed collision with another vehicle and a separate collision with a parked vehicle.

### **INCIDENT 2 – FLEEING SUBJECT – 83RD PRECINCT (FEMALE/BLACK/71) – 05/09/2024**

On May 9th, 2024, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop when the subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed. Officers attempted to follow the vehicle but lost sight of it. While canvassing in the immediate area, the subject vehicle was again observed operating at a high rate of speed when it struck two pedestrians in a crosswalk. Both pedestrians were removed to the hospital, one of whom was pronounced deceased. According to the pedestrian's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force neck and torso injuries.

### **INCIDENT 3 – COLLISION – 102ND PRECINCT (MALE/HISPANIC/23) – 05/19/2024**

On May 19th, 2024, officers were responding to a vehicle collision involving a possible fatality. While enroute, the officer's vehicle collided with an unrelated individual who was attempting to run across a highway. The individual was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt trauma to the head, neck, and torso.

### **INCIDENT 4 – COLLISION – 83RD PRECINCT (FEMALE/BLACK/29) – 05/26/2024**

On May 26th, 2024, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The suspect vehicle was travelling at a high rate of speed when it collided with a third vehicle, causing the third vehicle's rear passenger to be ejected and sustain multiple injuries. The passenger was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased on June 8th, 2024. According to the passenger's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple complications following blunt impact trauma of the head and torso.

### **INCIDENT 5 – COLLISION – 114TH PRECINCT (FEMALE/HISPANIC/36) – 10/22/2024**

On October 22nd, 2024, officers were responding to 911 calls of a crime in progress when the suspect vehicle fled from the scene at a high rate of speed and subsequently collided with a bicyclist. The bicyclist was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the bicyclist's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the torso and extremities.

### **INCIDENT 6 – COLLISION – 30TH PRECINCT (MALE/BLACK/45) – 11/02/2024**

On November 2nd, 2024, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The suspect vehicle fled at a high rate of speed and collided with a motorized scooter. The scooter operator was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the operator's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head, neck, and torso.

**INCIDENT 7 – COLLISION – 75TH PRECINCT (FEMALE/WHITE/58) – 11/20/2024**

On November 20th, 2024, officers were in an unmarked police vehicle and responding to a non-emergency request by another unit. At the same time, the individual, unbeknownst to the officers, entered the roadway and laid down in a lane of traffic. As the officers travelled in the direction of the requested location, their vehicle struck the individual as she was lying motionless in the street in a lane of traffic. The individual was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the individual's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head, neck, and torso.

As previously referenced, in 2024 FID investigated a death no custody contemplated case attributed to an incident that occurred during calendar year 2022.

**INCIDENT 8 – COLLISION – 41ST PRECINCT (FEMALE/HISPANIC/65) – 05/06/2023**

On October 6th, 2022, officers in a marked police vehicle were responding to a 911 call of a crime in progress. While proceeding around traffic with emergency lights and sirens activated, the police vehicle was struck by another vehicle and then subsequently struck several pedestrians on the sidewalk. The pedestrians were all removed to the hospital where one individual was pronounced deceased on May 6th, 2023. According to the individual's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of remote blunt impact injuries.



## **APPENDIX D**

### 2024 Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location of Occurrence

Precinct / Location	Adversarial Conflict	Animal Attack	Unintentional	Unauthorized/Suicide	Total
10	1	0	0	0	1
23	2	0	0	0	2
26	0	0	1	0	1
28	1	0	0	0	1
32	0	0	1	0	1
34	0	0	0	1	1
40	1	0	0	0	1
42	0	2	0	0	2
43	1	0	0	0	1
45	0	0	1	0	1
47	1	0	0	0	1
48	0	0	0	1	1
49	0	0	1	0	1
60	0	0	1	0	1
67	2	0	0	0	2
69	0	0	1	0	1
70	1	0	0	0	1
72	0	0	0	1	1
73	2	0	1	0	3
75	2	0	1	0	3
77	1	0	0	0	1
83	1	0	0	0	1
94	1	0	0	0	1
101	2	0	0	0	2
102	1	0	0	0	1
103	2	0	0	0	2
104	0	0	0	1	1
109	0	0	0	1	1
110	0	0	1	0	1
112	1	0	0	0	1
113	0	1	0	0	1
115	3	0	0	0	3
120	1	0	0	0	1
121	0	0	1	1	2
Dutchess County	0	0	0	1	1
Nassau County	0	0	2	1	3
Orange County	0	0	1	0	1
Outside of NYS	1	0	0	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>53</b>

Figure 58

## **APPENDIX E**

### Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges

Members of the Service Shot and Killed by Subjects by Decade, 1971-2024




Figure 59

Members of the Service Shot and Injured by Subjects by Decade, 1971-2024




Figure 60

Subjects Shot and Killed by  
Members of the Service by Decade, 1971-2024




Figure 61

Subjects Shot and Injured by  
Members of the Service by Decade, 1971-2024




Figure 62

Total Rounds Discharged by  
Members of the Service by Decade, 1971-2024




Figure 63

To view further historical data on police firearm discharges, please visit the NYPD website at [www.nyc.gov/nypd](http://www.nyc.gov/nypd).

## **APPENDIX F**

### 2024 Use of Force by Members' Command

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
001 Precinct	0	9	2	0	0	0	60	71
005 Precinct	0	13	1	0	0	0	62	76
006 Precinct	0	11	0	0	1	0	69	81
007 Precinct	0	17	0	0	0	0	75	92
009 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
009 Precinct	0	14	0	0	1	0	63	78
010 Precinct	0	8	0	0	0	0	58	66
013 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
013 Precinct	0	15	2	0	1	0	82	100
014 Precinct – Midtown South	0	23	0	0	0	0	101	124
017 Precinct	0	4	1	0	1	0	37	43
018 Precinct – Midtown North	0	14	0	0	1	0	76	91
019 Precinct	0	12	0	0	0	0	63	75
020 Precinct	0	6	0	0	2	0	31	39
023 Detective Squad	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	4
023 Precinct	1	14	0	0	0	0	80	95
024 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
024 Precinct	0	23	0	0	1	0	67	91
025 Precinct	0	13	0	0	0	0	85	98
026 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
026 Precinct	0	9	0	0	0	0	42	51
028 Precinct	1	21	2	0	2	0	126	152
030 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
030 Precinct	1	21	1	0	0	0	51	74
032 Detective Squad	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
032 Precinct	0	11	1	0	0	0	89	101
033 Precinct	0	11	1	0	0	0	69	81
034 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
034 Precinct	0	9	0	0	3	0	104	116
040 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
040 Precinct	1	39	0	0	2	0	278	320
041 Precinct	0	22	0	0	1	0	104	127
042 Precinct	3	32	0	0	3	0	131	169
043 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
043 Precinct	2	36	0	0	2	0	114	154
044 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
044 Precinct	0	61	2	0	1	0	211	275
045 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
045 Precinct	0	4	3	0	3	0	117	127
046 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2

Figure 64

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
046 Precinct	0	61	4	0	1	0	287	353
047 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
047 Precinct	0	48	0	0	2	0	188	238
048 Precinct	2	31	0	0	1	0	118	152
049 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
049 Precinct	1	37	1	0	4	0	78	121
050 Precinct	0	14	0	0	1	0	45	60
052 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
052 Precinct	0	35	2	0	3	0	148	188
060 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
060 Precinct	0	17	2	0	0	0	120	139
061 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
061 Precinct	0	8	0	0	1	0	76	85
062 Precinct	0	7	0	0	0	0	67	74
063 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
063 Precinct	0	13	0	0	1	0	52	66
066 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
066 Precinct	0	1	0	0	0	0	22	23
067 Precinct	1	34	0	0	2	0	186	223
068 Precinct	0	4	0	0	4	0	48	56
069 Precinct	0	35	0	0	3	0	78	116
070 Precinct	0	16	0	0	3	0	85	104
071 Precinct	0	7	1	0	2	0	59	69
072 Precinct	0	14	0	0	0	0	62	76
073 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
073 Precinct	2	20	3	0	4	0	156	185
075 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
075 Precinct	1	34	1	0	1	0	284	321
076 Precinct	0	2	0	0	0	0	47	49
077 Precinct	0	8	2	0	0	0	73	83
078 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
078 Precinct	0	4	0	0	0	0	29	33
079 Precinct	0	39	2	0	3	0	128	172
081 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
081 Precinct	0	17	1	0	0	0	62	80
083 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
083 Precinct	2	16	1	0	1	0	91	111
084 Precinct	1	17	0	0	0	0	83	101
088 Precinct	0	11	1	0	2	0	38	52
090 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
090 Precinct	0	13	4	0	0	0	73	90
094 Precinct	0	8	1	0	0	0	39	48

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
100 Precinct	0	11	0	0	0	0	57	68
101 Precinct	1	12	1	0	0	0	127	141
101 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
102 Precinct	1	10	1	0	1	0	60	73
102 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
103 Precinct	3	48	1	0	1	0	167	220
103 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
104 Precinct	0	19	0	0	1	0	64	84
104 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
105 Precinct	0	28	1	0	1	0	101	131
105 Detective Squad	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
106 Precinct	0	11	1	0	2	0	62	76
107 Precinct	0	12	0	0	0	0	63	75
108 Precinct	0	14	1	0	0	0	83	98
108 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
109 Precinct	0	3	0	0	0	0	64	67
109 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
110 Precinct	1	18	1	0	0	0	116	136
111 Precinct	0	2	0	0	0	0	18	20
111 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
112 Precinct	1	2	0	0	1	0	52	56
112 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
113 Precinct	1	32	2	0	0	0	104	139
113 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
114 Precinct	2	15	1	0	1	0	131	150
115 Precinct	2	13	0	0	0	0	85	100
116 Precinct	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
120 Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
120 Precinct	1	27	0	0	1	0	121	150
121 Precinct	0	18	1	0	1	0	105	125
122 Precinct	0	4	0	0	0	0	39	43
123 Precinct	0	10	0	0	0	0	27	37
Auto Crime	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Behavioral Health Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Brooklyn Robbery Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bronx Court Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
Bronx East School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	19
Bronx Robbery Squad	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bronx Special Victims Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Bronx West School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
Brooklyn Court Section	0	2	0	0	3	0	44	49

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
Building Maintenance Section	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Canine Team	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Central Investigations Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Central Park Precinct	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	7
Central Robbery Division	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	4
Chief Crime Control Strategies	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Chief of Department Inv Review Section	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
Chief of Special Operations	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	7
Cold Case Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Community Affairs Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
Crime Prevention Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Criminal Enterprise Inv Section	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	4
Critical Response Command	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	7
CT Bureau Lower Man Security Init	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CT Operational Support Section	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
DA Squad Queens	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Dep Comm Public Information	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Det Boro Bklyn North Homicide Squad	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Det Boro Brooklyn South	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Det Boro Bronx Operations	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Det Boro Queens North	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Det Boro Queens South	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
Det Boro Staten Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Det Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Drug Enforcement T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
Emergency Service Squad 01	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	5
Emergency Service Squad 02	0	7	0	0	0	0	3	10
Emergency Service Squad 03	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
Emergency Service Squad 04	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	5

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
Emergency Service Squad 05	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	7
Emergency Service Squad 06	1	3	0	0	0	0	5	9
Emergency Service Squad 07	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	10
Emergency Service Squad 08	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	6
Emergency Service Squad 09	0	3	1	0	0	0	2	6
Emergency Service Squad 10	0	2	1	0	0	0	2	5
Emergency Service Unit	1	3	0	0	0	0	9	13
Equal Employ Opportunity Division	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Financial Crimes T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Firearms & Tactics Section	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
First Deputy Commissioner's Office	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Force Investigation Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Grand Larceny Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Gun Violence Supp Div Z1 (BK, Qns, SI)	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
Gun Violence Supp Div Z2 (Manh, BX)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Harbor Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Hate Crime T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HB Bronx/Queens Response Team	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HB Brooklyn Response Team	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
HB Manhattan Response Team	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	5
Headquarters Security Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Health and Wellness Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Highway Unit No 1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
Highway Unit No 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Highway Unit No 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Highway Unit No 5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Housing Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Housing PSA 1	1	8	0	0	0	0	44	53
Housing PSA 2	1	8	0	0	0	0	82	91

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
Housing PSA 3	0	12	2	0	5	0	92	111
Housing PSA 4	0	8	0	0	0	0	32	40
Housing PSA 5	1	8	2	0	1	0	88	100
Housing PSA 6	0	4	0	0	1	0	41	46
Housing PSA 7	0	16	0	0	4	0	54	74
Housing PSA 8	0	13	0	0	2	0	30	45
Housing PSA 9	0	3	0	0	0	0	13	16
Intel-Criminal Intel Section	0	3	0	0	0	0	42	45
Internal Affairs Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
Investigative Support Section	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Legal Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Major Case Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Manhattan Court Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	40
Manhattan Robbery Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Medical Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Missing Persons Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MTN Detective Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Narcotics Boro Bronx	0	1	0	0	0	0	29	30
Narcotics Boro Brooklyn North	0	1	0	0	0	0	17	18
Narcotics Boro Brooklyn South	1	0	0	0	0	0	14	15
Narcotics Bureau Manhattan North	0	2	0	0	0	0	34	36
Narcotics Bureau Manhattan South	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
Narcotics Bureau Queens North	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
Narcotics Bureau Queens South	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	35
Narcotics Bureau Staten Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
Office of Mgmt Analysis & Planning	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Operations Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Other	0	0	2	0	0	0	13	15
Patrol Boro Brooklyn North	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Patrol Bureau Brooklyn South	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Patrol Bureau Bronx	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
Patrol Boro Manhattan North	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	7
Patrol Boro Manhattan South	0	21	1	0	0	0	135	157
Patrol Boro Queens North	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
Patrol Boro Queens South	1	4	0	0	2	0	33	40
Patrol Bureau Staten Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Patrol Services Bureau	0	2	0	0	0	0	73	75
PBBN School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
PBBN Specialized Units	0	1	0	0	0	0	15	16
PBBS School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
PBBS Specialized Units	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	8
PBBX Specialized Units	0	14	0	0	1	0	130	145
PBMN School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PBMN Specialized Units	0	2	0	0	0	0	56	58
PBMS School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PBMS Specialized Units	0	8	0	0	0	0	56	64
PBQN School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
PBQN Specialized Units	0	7	0	0	0	0	39	46
PBQS School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	17
PBQS Specialized Units	0	8	0	0	0	0	24	32
PBSI School Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PBSI Specialized Units	0	6	0	0	0	0	51	57
Police Laboratory	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Property Clerk Section	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
QNS Court Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
Queens Robbery Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Queens special Victims Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
School Safety Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
Special Frauds Squad	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Special Victims Division Zone 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Specialized Training Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Staten Island Court Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Stolen Property Inquiry Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Strategic Response Group 1 Manhattan	0	2	0	0	0	0	74	76

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
Strategic Response Group 2 Bronx	0	5	0	0	1	0	43	49
Strategic Response Group 3 Brooklyn	1	0	0	0	0	0	29	30
Strategic Response Group 4 Queens	0	1	0	0	1	0	17	19
Strategic Response Group 5 SI	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
Strategic Response Group Strategic Technology Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Strike Force	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TB Anti-Terrorism Unit	0	6	0	0	2	0	30	38
TB Citywide Vandals T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TB Special Operations Division	0	3	1	0	0	0	48	52
Training Bureau	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	3
Transit Boro Brooklyn T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Transit Boro Manhattan T/F	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	13
Transit Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Transit Bureau Canine Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Transit Bureau District 1	0	9	1	0	1	0	67	78
Transit Bureau District 11	0	12	2	0	0	0	66	80
Transit Bureau District 12	0	22	0	0	1	0	107	130
Transit Bureau District 2	0	16	1	0	0	0	55	72
Transit Bureau District 20	0	1	0	0	1	0	51	53
Transit Bureau District 23	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	12
Transit Bureau District 3	1	2	0	0	2	0	50	55
Transit Bureau District 30	0	9	1	0	3	0	35	48
Transit Bureau District 32	0	9	1	0	4	0	52	66
Transit Bureau District 33	0	7	0	0	5	0	79	91
Transit Bureau District 34	1	2	0	0	0	0	16	19
Transit Bureau District 4	0	9	0	0	8	0	47	64
Transit Bureau Response Team	0	7	0	0	3	0	62	72
TRB Bronx Traffic Enf. Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB Brooklyn Traffic Enf. Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB Citywide Traffic T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB Highway District	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TRB Manhattan Summons Enf. Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
TRB North Intersection Control	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB Queens Traffic Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB South Intersection Control	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TRB Staten Isl. Traffic Enforcement Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB Traffic Special Ops Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB Traffic Enforcement District	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Uniformed Promotions Trng Unit	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
VED Major Case Section	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Vice Enforcement Division Zone 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Vice Enforcement Division Zone 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
Warrant Section	2	13	1	0	1	0	66	83
World Trade Center Command	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Youth Strategies Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50*</b>	<b>1,695</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9,793</b>	<b>11,746</b>

Figure 64 (continued)

\*This figure does not include three separate discharge incidents, all categorized as unauthorized discharges, in which a member discharged their firearm. Though not captured within this TRI data, all three incidents are included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharges section of this report.

Additionally, the 2024 force data includes the 116th Precinct. Located in the Patrol Borough Queens South, this precinct opened late in the calendar year 2024 and encompasses a geographical area previously designated within the confines of either the 105th or 113th Precincts. Force incidents that occurred prior to the opening of the 116th Precinct would be appropriately attributed to either the 105th or 113th Precinct.



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